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Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address 
Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal 
Federalism Framework 
Blake Hudson 
ABSTRACT 
 
Scholars analyzing the intersection of federalism and disaster law 
and policy have primarily focused on the difficulties federalism poses for 
interjurisdictional coordination of disaster response. Though scholars 
have highlighted that rising disaster risks and costs are associated with 
“land-use planning that exacerbates, rather than mitigates, disaster 
risk,” a more holistic analysis of land-use-related disaster law and policy 
is needed. This Article provides a more comprehensive framework within 
which to analyze prospective mitigation or prevention of disaster risk 
and costs through a rebalancing—or reconstituting—of the respective 
roles of the federal and state governments in land-use planning. The 
federal government does not currently maintain direct regulatory 
inputs into a variety of land-use planning policies that exacerbate 
disaster risks and costs—a situation that likely results from the history of 
jurisprudence declaring that land-use regulation is the “quintessential 
state and local government” power under the Constitution. Even so, 
because of the national interests at stake and the greater capacity of the 
federal government to coordinate standards for disasters with very large 
interjurisdictional impacts, greater federal regulatory inputs for 
certain disasters are needed where state and local governments have 
failed to formulate standards. For other land-use-related disasters, 
federal inputs may be less necessary, though overlapping federal, state, 
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and local government regulations can yield even more robust disaster 
mitigation and prevention policies. 
This Article first categorizes the various disasters that implicate 
state and local government land-use planning along a “transitory-
perpetual” spectrum. This spectrum provides a frame of reference for 
assessing which land-use-related disasters are more localized with 
shorter temporal effects, and which therefore may require fewer federal 
inputs, and those that have far longer temporal effects and larger 
interjurisdictional impacts of nationwide import, therefore requiring 
greater federal input. The spectrum further provides a framework for 
determining the viability, from a constitutional perspective, of federal 
regulatory inputs into land-use planning for which more federal inputs 
may be needed. This constitutional analysis is undertaken in the context 
of a theory of “Bimodal Federalism,” which integrates two modes of 
operation of modern U.S. federalism, acknowledging the trend toward 
the new “Dynamic Federalism” theory that normatively disregards 
separate constitutional spheres of authority for the state and local 
governments, while also incorporating the reality that remnants of 
“Dual Federalism” theory still inform constitutional jurisprudence 
related to certain subject matters—like land-use planning.  
Finally, based upon the transitory-perpetual spectrum 
categorizations and informed by bimodal federalism analysis, this 
Article assesses the appropriate legislative mechanisms for reconstituting 
land-use disaster federalism. This Article hypothesizes that those 
disasters closer to the perpetual end of the spectrum also happen to be the 
ones for which top-down federal inputs into land-use policy are both 
more desirable and less constitutionally suspect. Correspondingly, for 
land-use-related disasters that are more transitory in nature, top-down 
federal inputs may be more constitutionally suspect, thus calling for a 
need to explore bilateral and horizontal mechanisms of reconstituting 
federalism for all categories of disaster. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1993 
II. DISASTERS THAT IMPLICATE LAND-USE PLANNING AND 
THE TRANSITORY-PERPETUAL DISASTER SPECTRUM ...... 1999 
A. Transitory Disasters .................................................... 2001 
1. Localized flooding ............................................... 2001 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 2:51 PM 
1991 Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism 
 1993 
2. Fires ..................................................................... 2004 
3. Heat waves ........................................................... 2006 
B. Perpetual Disasters ..................................................... 2008 
1. Sea-level rise ......................................................... 2008 
2. Gulf/bay pollution and eutrophication from 
nonpoint runoff .................................................. 2012 
3. Invasive species..................................................... 2014 
C. Variables in the “Gray Area” of the Spectrum: Disaster 
Frequency and Durational Impact ............................ 2017 
1. Frequency—gulf hurricanes and Mississippi River 
Valley flooding .................................................... 2018 
2. Durational Impact—nuclear plant incident and the 
“Big One” earthquake ........................................ 2021 
D. Implications of the Transitory-Perpetual Disaster 
Spectrum Categorization .......................................... 2024 
III. MECHANISMS OF RECONSTITUTING FEDERALISM WITHIN 
THE BIMODAL FEDERALISM FRAMEWORK ...................... 2025 
A. The Bimodal Federalism Framework: Integrating 
Dynamic Federalism with Remnants of Dual 
Federalism ................................................................ 2029 
B. Top-Down ................................................................. 2039 
1. Constitutional amendment ................................... 2040 
2. Constitutional interpretation ................................ 2043 
C. Bilateral ..................................................................... 2049 
1. Cooperative federalism ......................................... 2050 
2. Uncooperative federalism ..................................... 2054 
D. Horizontal ................................................................. 2057 
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 2060 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Disasters present important governance challenges because they 
rarely respect political and regulatory boundaries.1 
 
The headline read, “Minnesota Farmer Battles Gulf ‘Dead 
Zone’”2—an intriguing caption to say the least. How could a farmer 
 
 1. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 75 (2d ed. 2010). 
 2. John D. Sutter, Minnesota Farmer Battles Gulf ‘Dead Zone,’  CNN (Aug. 30, 2010), 
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from Minnesota directly and positively impact a resource over one 
thousand miles away? The article was about the 2010 dead zone in 
the Gulf of Mexico, one of the largest recorded dead zones in 
history, scientists say—about the size of the state of New Jersey.3 
The dead zone is caused largely by sedimentation and fertilizer 
containing nitrogen and phosphorus flowing to the ocean from 
farms all along the Mississippi river. These chemicals rob the water of 
oxygen, preventing sea life from respiring. Remarkably, 40% of the 
land in the United States drains into the Gulf of Mexico via the 
Mississippi River Valley.4 The dead zone effectively pits farmers 
against fishermen because fertilizer runoff from farming operations 
ultimately has an aggregated, substantial effect on commercial 
fisheries in the Gulf. One of the most dramatic examples of fishery 
impacts are “suicidal shrimp” that actually leap onto the beach in 
search of oxygen only to die.5 Commercial interests, however, are 
not all that are at stake in the Gulf. Scientists are worried that if 
yearly dead zones continue to grow, the Gulf’s entire ecosystem will 
reach a “tipping point” from which it may not recover.6  
The Minnesota farmer in the story said he considered people 
who live and work near the Gulf of Mexico his “neighbors.”7 The 
story highlighted the farmer’s recognition that “the land, water and 
air are inextricably tied and that the actions of one farmer can be felt 
thousands of miles away.”8 The farmer’s perspective is unique, of 
course, as it is exceedingly difficult for most farmers in the 
Mississippi River Valley to acknowledge, much less establish a plan to 
rectify, the negative impacts that their activities have on a resource as 
distant as the Gulf.9 Noting that he would “much rather eat wild 
 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-30/tech/gulf.dead.zone.minnesota.farm_1_dead-zone-
gulf-shrimp?_s=PM:TECH. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a 
Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 21, 22 (2002) (“[Farmers] have not, however, been particularly good stewards of our 
water resources: excessive or inappropriate use of fertilizers and pesticides, soil erosion, habitat 
alteration, soil salinization, animal wastes, and rates of water usage are causing serious water 
quality problems throughout the country. Indeed, agricultural nonpoint source pollution is 
now considered the nation’s most persistent and most difficult water quality problem.”). 
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Gulf shrimp than farmed shrimp,” however, the Minnesota farmer 
decided to adjust his farming methods.10 He stopped tilling his land 
in order to decrease nitrogen and phosphorus runoff. He planted 
alfalfa along the edge of his farm—alfalfa is a “greedy” plant that 
extracts most of the nitrogen and phosphorus before it gets to the 
waterway. He also, rather cost-effectively, placed a bioreactor in the 
ground near the stream that removes nitrates from the water.11 It 
worked. The farmer’s yields actually went up, wildlife he had not 
seen in years returned, and the water in the area became clearer.12 
Until more farmers engage in similar conduct, however, Gulf 
fishermen will not be happy. One commercial fisherman from 
Louisiana colorfully declared, “you s[hit] in the river, then you s[hit] 
down here . . . . They send us all the garbage; it comes down the 
river to us,” to create what he called “the cesspool of the nation.”13 
He continued, “The government ought to have a team of scientists 
working on that. How bad are they going to let it get before 
somebody stops it?”14 Ultimately, the article concluded that more 
actions like those undertaken by the Minnesota farmer are necessary 
to prevent further degradation of the Gulf, and that “cleaning up the 
Gulf from the Midwest will require continental changes.”15 
The story of the Minnesota farmer and the Gulf is emblematic of 
one of the primary legal complications for addressing environmental 
problems generally, and disasters like the Gulf dead zone specifically: 
the constitutional division of regulatory authority between the 
federal and state governments, or federalism. The federal 
government does not currently regulate many land-use activities 
related to farming, such as nonpoint source pollution from 
agricultural sediment and fertilizer runoff, a situation that likely 
results from the history of jurisprudence declaring that land-use 
regulation is the “quintessential state and local power” under the 
Constitution.16 In turn, states are doing little in the way of exercising 
 
 10. Sutter, supra note 2. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. State governments maintain the primary responsibility to regulate land use under 
their authority to exercise the “police power” for protection of the “general welfare.” See 
generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of 
legal and political opinion holds that this allocation of power in [the U.S.] leaves the states in 
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their quintessential regulatory role to curb land-based pollution of 
the type affecting the Gulf. Thus in the Mississippi Valley we have a 
quintessential commons—in the absence of coordination, either 
among state and local governments or provided by a higher-level 
authority, such as the federal government, individual subnational 
governments refuse to address nonpoint source pollution, and their 
collective inaction damages the shared Gulf resource.17 Indeed, 
disaster law in the context of land use presents an ironic scenario, as 
state and local governments resist federal involvement in land-use 
decision-making,18 but after a major disaster occurs, state and local 
officials declare, as did one official after Hurricane Andrew struck 
Florida in 1992, “Where in the hell is the cavalry on this one?”19—
and all of the cavalry’s money too, of course. When such disasters 
strike, the federal government may be called upon by any one of the 
nearly 89,000 subnational governments20 for disaster relief, which 
totals billions of dollars each year in the United States alone.21 A 
common refrain is “why doesn’t the federal government do 
something?” This is a completely justifiable question in the context 
of coordinating disaster response since state and local governments 
 
charge of regulating how private land is used,” JOHN R. NOLON, PATRICIA E. SALKIN & 
MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008), and 
that “[l]and use law has always been a creature of state and local law,” Marci A. Hamilton, 
Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003). The U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized that “regulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.” Rapanos 
v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 
n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.”). 
 17. See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons 
Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 18. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private 
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 339 (2003) (“[L]ocal 
governments historically have zealously guarded local control over land use.”). 
 19. Thomas Birkland & Sarah Waterman, Is Federalism the Reason for Policy Failure in 
Hurricane Katrina?, 38 PUBLIUS: J. OF FEDERALISM 692, 697 (2008), available at 
http://www.mrterpak.com/uploads/5/1/5/9/5159930/is_federalism_the_reason_for_polic
y_failure_in_hurricane_katrina.pdf. 
 20. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 
267 tbl.427 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/ 
11s0426.pdf. 
 21. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 3. Worldwide, the cost of disaster was below $25 
billion annually in 1975, but was over $150 billion in 2005. See U.N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR 
DISASTER REDUCTION, 2005 DISASTERS IN NUMBERS 1 (2005), available at 
http://cnre.vt.edu/lsg/intro/2005-disaster-in-numbers.pdf.  
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cannot be expected to have the manpower or resources to adequately 
respond to such large-scale disasters.  
Oftentimes, however, state and local governments are complicit 
in the extent of a disaster’s human and economic costs because they 
fail to mitigate those losses by engaging in more responsible, 
environmentally conscious land-use planning. Take, for example, Bay 
St. Louis, Mississippi officials who recently sought to remove 
markers along the interstate denoting the high-water flood mark 
reached during Hurricane Katrina.22 The extent of Katrina’s 
destruction was in no small part due to urban and agricultural 
development of floodplains that destroyed natural wetland buffer 
systems. The floodwaters from Katrina in this particular area were so 
high that they reached the overhead span where Interstate 10 
crossed over another highway.23 Even so, a Bay St. Louis 
councilmember believed that “the markers are detrimental to 
attracting businesses that might want to relocate [in the area], 
especially on undeveloped property around the interstate.”24 In fact, 
“[s]ome city leaders envision the interstate property as a magnet that 
will pull in restaurants, motels, and big-box retailers.”25 These 
commercial establishments may very well be under water during the 
next Katrina, but local government officials and economic 
development interests want to keep that information hidden from 
passersby. In this way communities often want the federal 
government to bail them out of disaster crises that they themselves 
are complicit in exacerbating. 
Disaster Law and Policy scholars have recognized that rising 
disaster risks and costs are largely associated with “land use planning 
that exacerbates, rather than mitigates, disaster risk.”26 Despite this 
recognition, scholars have not provided a holistic framework within 
which to assess how land-use-related federalism issues might best be 
resolved to aid disaster mitigation and prevention. A holistic 
theoretical assessment is warranted especially because society 
 
 22. The Associated Press, Bay St. Louis Officials Oppose Hurricane Katrina High-Water 
Markers on Highway, NOLA.COM (July 23, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/ 
katrina/index.ssf/2011/07/bay_st_louis_officials_oppose.html. 
 23.  Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 10. 
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continues to witness an increase in disasters associated with land use 
as population grows and the land base is further developed.  
Not only do well-recognized land-use-related disasters need to 
be studied more holistically, but society also faces a variety of new 
disaster challenges for which it must formulate policy responses. For 
example, how does sea-level rise associated with climate change shift 
the debate about the appropriate role of the federal government in 
land-use planning in coastal areas likely to be inundated? Should the 
federal government leave it to state and local governments alone to 
resolve, even if greater long-term costs will accrue to the federal 
government in response efforts? Or should the federal government 
have a greater say in land-use decision making in order to mitigate 
the devastating effects of sea level rise along the coast? Similarly, 
society continues to gain new insights into well-recognized land-use-
related disasters that call for innovative policy responses. For 
example, wetlands along the coast of Louisiana have long been 
subject to a certain level of federal regulatory involvement, primarily 
in the form of the Clean Water Act’s 404 wetland fill permitting 
program.27 Hurricane Katrina, however, exposed more clearly than 
ever the impacts, social and economic, of aggregated individual land 
development projects facilitated by state and local planning that filled 
in wetlands and destroyed a key hurricane buffer system. This raises 
questions about how seriously we have taken the role of the federal 
government in staving off those types of disasters, especially 
considering the Army Corps of Engineers high issuance rate of 
wetland fill permits.28 The same can be said for the development of 
floodplains along the Mississippi River that have greatly exacerbated 
the destruction caused by flood events. 
Ultimately, though scholars have discussed how federalism has 
complicated disaster response, due to questions of appropriate 
 
 27. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
 28. The Corps receives an average of over 80,000 permit requests annually; of these, 
only about 9% are required to go through a “detailed evaluation for an individual permit”; 
most are approved through a nationwide or region-specific permit. Of the 9% that have to file 
for an individual permit, less than 0.3% are denied. In Louisiana alone, between 1988 and 
1996, 99% of all permit applications were granted, including 92% in flood disaster areas. 
Brandee Ketchum, Note, Like the Swamp Thing: Something Ambiguous Rises From the Hidden 
Depths of Murky Waters—The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Murky Wet Land in Rapanos v. 
United States, 68 LA. L. REV. 983, 1011–12 (2008) (footnotes omitted). In addition, the 
EPA only exercised its power to veto the Corps wetland permitting eleven times between 1972 
and 2007. CRAIG PITTMAN & MATTHEW WAITE, PAVING PARADISE: FLORIDA'S VANISHING 
WETLANDS AND THE FAILURE OF NO NET LOSS 167 (2009). 
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jurisdiction, lack of coordinated response, and similar difficulties 
created by multiple jurisdictions attempting to provide relief after 
disaster strikes,29 this Article seeks to provide a holistic theoretical 
framework within which to address problems of land-use-related 
disaster mitigation and prevention. Part II provides a brief overview 
of various disasters that implicate direct land-use planning, currently 
considered the sole regulatory purview of state and local 
governments, and then categorizes these disasters along a spectrum 
from “transitory” to “perpetual,” to provide a mechanism for 
assessing which types of disasters might warrant greater federal 
involvement relative to subnational controls. While this overview 
does not constitute an exhaustive list, it does provide a foundation 
for categorizing land-use-related disasters for more comprehensive 
future study. In addition, this discussion recognizes that both federal 
and subnational policy components need adjusting to formulate 
effective disaster mitigation and prevention policies related to land-
use planning, as the federal, state, and local governments are 
complicit in either establishing policies promoting poor land-use 
planning or not intervening with more stringent land-use planning 
standards. Part III begins with a discussion of the “Bimodal 
Federalism” framework which more appropriately captures the 
current scope of respective federal-state regulatory roles by 
integrating the dynamic theory of federalism with remnant dualist 
notions of federalism that still impact land-use law and policy across 
governance scales. Part III then discusses the available methods for 
“reconstituting federalism” for these different categories of disaster 
considering the bimodal federalism framework—that is, positing 
cursory hypotheses regarding both the need for and the most 
constitutionally viable means of gaining greater federal inputs into 
certain categories of land-use-related disaster mitigation and 
prevention. Part IV concludes. 
II. DISASTERS THAT IMPLICATE LAND-USE PLANNING AND THE 
TRANSITORY-PERPETUAL DISASTER SPECTRUM 
A variety of disasters implicate land-use planning, which has long 
been considered the exclusive constitutional purview of state and 
local governments. These disasters may be placed along a spectrum 
from transitory to perpetual. Transitory disasters occur periodically 
 
 29. See generally Birkland & Waterman, supra note 19. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 2:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2000 
and have effects that are generally limited to smaller geographic 
scales, with fewer jurisdictional spillover effects. On the other end of 
the spectrum are perpetual disasters, which may be gradual but are 
continual, making it exceedingly difficult to see their effects across 
narrow temporal scales—even though they eventually lead to crises 
and destruction of nationwide effect. As a result, these disasters have 
far greater jurisdictional spillover effects and nationwide implications. 
Some disasters fall within a “gray area” between the transitory and 
perpetual ends of the spectrum, due to greater frequency or 
durational impact, or both. For example, these disasters may 
technically be transitory, in that there is a temporal break between 
disaster events, but they can occur so frequently as to mimic 
perpetual disasters and can recur for a long enough period of time to 
cause nationwide impacts and warrant greater national interest. An 
example would be Gulf hurricanes, which, over decades, occur with 
regularity and often lead to enormous federal government 
expenditures in the form of disaster relief. Similarly, some disasters 
may only occur once, or far less often than do “pure” transitory 
disasters, but the durational impact is of a tremendous magnitude 
with nationwide implications. An example would be an explosion or 
reactor failure at a nuclear plant. Each of these different types of 
“gray area” disasters along the spectrum operate for a conceptually 
severed period of time just like perpetual disasters, with long-lasting 
aftereffects. And, of course, a disaster can both be of the high 
frequency variety and have great durational impact, like Hurricane 
Katrina. 
To be clear, the groups into which these disasters are categorized 
are not mutually exclusive, and the categorization of each depends 
upon the case-specific circumstances presented over time regarding 
any one type of disaster. In addition, the disasters themselves are not 
mutually exclusive in occurrence, meaning that hurricanes cause 
flooding; hurricanes and earthquakes can cause nuclear plant 
incidents; heat waves can cause fires; and climate change contributes 
to sea-level rise, the spread of invasive species, the frequency and 
severity of hurricane events, and localized heat waves. The 
categorization undertaken below, therefore, is merely meant to 
provide a general framework within which to analyze which disaster 
events might require greater federal inputs into land-use planning for 
disaster mitigation and prevention and the most constitutionally 
viable mechanisms for doing so.  
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A. Transitory Disasters 
1. Localized flooding  
The best means of limiting flood damages to human development is to keep the 
development away from high-risk areas.30 
Localized flooding has plagued civilization for as long as there 
have been permanent settlements. Societies require access to water to 
survive. As a result, early settlement patterns along river courses, near 
bays and estuaries, within other watersheds, and along the coast 
remain with us today.31 To obtain the rewards that accompany living 
in these areas, societies also must live with the risks, including 
flooding. Floods cause more damage in the aggregate than virtually 
any other natural disaster.32 Measurable flood-related losses are now 
greater than $4 billion a year.33 
As with most disasters, the structure of modern society has 
exacerbated flood risks and costs. The simple math of rising 
populations means more people live in flood-prone areas. In 
addition, urban development and the human-built environment have 
further intensified flood damages. Not only does development 
increase the amount of impermeable surface in an area, thus 
“increasing the quantity and speed of runoff from rain and melting 
snow . . .”,34 but it also eliminates floodplains and wetlands that 
would otherwise absorb floodwaters.35 The risks of flooding will only 
increase as populations increase. Currently there are over 125 million 
housing units in the United States, with all the attendant impervious 
surfaces (such as roofs and parking lots) that contribute to flooding 
(and pollutant) disasters.36 By 2040, the United States will need 70 
 
 30. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 337. 
 31. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 23. 
 32. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and 
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 62 (1985) (“Flooding is the most frequent and the most 
costly natural catastrophe in the United States, if not the world. Nine of every ten natural 
disasters in this country are flood-related.”). 
 33. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 306. 
 34. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 24. 
 35. U.N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION, 2009 GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 
REPORT ON DISASTER RISK REDUCTION: RISK AND POVERTY IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 72 
(2009), available at http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/report/ 
documents/GAR_Chapter_3_2009_eng.pdf. 
 36. Arthur C. Nelson & Robert E. Lang, The Next 100 Million, 73 PLAN. 4, 4 (2007). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 2:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2002 
million more housing units, and 40 million of these will be built on 
new residential lots.37  
As discussed below in Part II.C, it is true that flooding events in 
certain large watersheds might more appropriately fit in the gray area 
between transitory and perpetual disasters. Furthermore, localized 
flooding is directly related to other “gray area” and perpetual 
disasters discussed below, such as hurricanes and sea-level rise. Yet, 
due to the typically localized nature of day-to-day weather patterns, 
most flooding events are limited in geographic and jurisdictional 
scope. As a result, land-use planning standards of local governments, 
which are ultimately directed (or not directed) at the state level, have 
the potential to either mitigate or exacerbate localized flooding 
events occurring within jurisdictional boundaries.  
In addition to the Bay St. Louis example highlighted in the 
Introduction, consider the severe flooding in Missouri in 1993. 
Missouri spent the next ten years facilitating $2.2 billion of 
investment into new development on land that had been underwater 
during the floods. To this day, Missouri does not maintain 
comprehensive floodplain management legislation, and local officials 
“are attracted to the clarion call of tax revenue and job creation.”38 
One local Missouri councilwoman exhibited a “race-to-the-bottom” 
mentality by stating her community had “in the past . . . hugged a 
lot of trees, and we’ve lost out on a lot of development. We’re going 
to be surrounded by businesses while we’re looking at flood plain.”39  
Missouri not only passively refused to intervene in the 
development of floodplains, but it has actively encouraged new 
development in floodplains by funding the construction of new 
levees. This is despite the “virtual consensus among floodplain 
managers that current floodplain management relies too much on 
structural solutions”—that is, building codes and additional levees—
rather than “nonstructural solutions,” such as prohibitions on 
development or even relocation of some communities out of flood 
zones.40 As a result, “[s]tricter, wiser land use restrictions are widely 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 34–35 (citing Christopher Carey, Cities Look to 
Flood Plains for Jobs, Growth, Tax Dollars, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 29, 2003, at A1). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 28. 
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viewed as the most critical and indispensable element of effective 
floodplain management moving forward.”41 
The responsibility for localized flooding exacerbated by human-
built capital is not limited to subnational governments. Rather, it is 
shared with the federal government. Indeed, “private decisions to 
live and work in hazardous locations are shaped by local land use 
policies, and those local land use decisions are, in turn, heavily 
influenced by state and federal incentives.”42 Missouri’s investment in 
the levee system was actually subsidized by the federal government, 
and such subsidies have historically been the typical federal 
contribution to floodplain management. In Missouri’s case, federal 
government representatives stated, “‘[w]e don’t make a value 
judgment on whether that property should be protected . . . . As 
long as people can show they can meet the requirements, they’ll get 
a permit, whether we like building in the flood plain or not.’”43  
As Professor Barnhizer has argued, governments at all levels 
continue to “expend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to 
repair repeated and foreseeable damage to unwise and unsustainable 
private development and public infrastructure and facilities. Instead 
of limiting flood-plain development, those policies and practices 
continue to maintain development against rising sea levels, climate 
change, extreme weather phenomena, and erosion.”44 Barnhizer cites 
flood insurance, construction of flood control structures like levees 
and dams, and “liberal” disaster relief policies as warping risk 
perceptions and, in turn, warping the value of property in 
floodplains.45 Property values are artificially inflated, making it much 
more expensive for the government to pay “just compensation” if it 
decides to purchase property to recapture flood control values and 
mitigate flood damage. In other words, “[t]hese artificially enhanced 
 
 41. Id. Floodplain managers have argued that “avoidance of floodprone and/or 
ecologically sensitive areas should be axiomatic in planning new development . . . . We need to 
begin a pattern of gradual and voluntary resettlement of those portions of communities that 
already have been located in the highest-risk or most ecologically sensitive areas . . . .” ASS’N 
OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT 2050, at 33 (2007). 
 42. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 25–26. 
 43. Sara Shipley, Unprecedented Growth in the Flood Plain Brings Riches and Risks; 
Business Grows on Land Under Water 10 Years Ago, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 27, 
2003, at A1 (quoting Alan Dooley, a spokesman for the Army Corps of Engineers’ St. Louis 
District). 
 44. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 296. 
 45. Id. at 296–97. 
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values result in a form of ‘double dipping’ by landowners. . . . Such 
double-dipping dramatically increases government costs of floodplain 
management by requiring double payments, both for ineffective past 
flood responses and for the costs of correcting those past mistakes 
through property acquisition.”46 
Another example of the federal government’s complicity in 
exacerbating localized flood risk and destruction related to land-use 
planning is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). After 
Hurricane Ivan, the federal government encouraged residents to 
rebuild in disaster prone areas by paying out $15 million through the 
NFIP; after Katrina, the amount increased to $44 million.47 The 
NFIP mandates artificial insurance rates which are “not actuarially 
based [and] have subsidized development in hazardous areas [] by 
ensuring that developers can build in floodplains confident that they 
can obtain relatively low-cost, below market insurance against any 
flood risks.”48 Indeed, the complicity of both the federal and state 
governments in exacerbating disaster risks and costs is a theme that 
runs throughout nearly every category of disaster discussed below, as 
“state and federal land use and development policies that have 
fostered improper rebuilding back in hazardous areas and impede 
prospects for sensible, local, predisaster planning.”49 
2. Fires 
Forest and brush fires are also typically disasters with more 
localized effects. Thus, land-use policies related to zoning of 
residential and commercial development can impact the degree of 
harm and costs caused by fire events. State forest and brush 
management standards can also play a role, as they may or may not 
dictate rules regarding prescribed burns or other methods of 
removing copious quantities of fuel that can build up and make fires 
far more severe.  
 
 46. Id. at 297 (footnote omitted) (quoting Edward Thompson, Jr., The Government 
Giveth, ENVTL. FORUM, Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 22, 26). 
 47. Kevin Ramakrishna, Comment, Subduing the Ceaseless Storm: Breaking the Build-
Destroy-Rebuild Cycle Following Major Catastrophes Through Taxation and Responsibility, 2 
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 328, 341 (2009). 
 48. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 32. 
 49. Philip R. Berke & Thomas J. Campanella, Planning for Postdisaster Resiliency, 604 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 192, 195 (2006). 
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Sometimes policies placing development in or around fire-prone 
areas and methods for controlling fires can converge in a negative 
way—especially when neither is carried out effectively. For instance, 
a controlled burn in New Mexico in May 2000 raged out of control, 
largely because it was started during a severe drought and when 
winds were high. The damage from the fire was greater than it might 
have otherwise been because of its proximity to the city of Los 
Alamos.50 The fire destroyed or damaged more than 439 homes, 
numerous businesses, and 7 million trees, resulting in an estimated 
$1 billion in total damages.51 Furthermore, more than 1000 families 
suffered damages, while approximately 18,000 residents were forced 
to evacuate.52 As Farber et al. note, 
The proximity of communities to wildlands puts those 
communities at risk for catastrophic fires and limits options for 
wildland fire management by increasing the riskiness of prescribed 
burns and by pressuring [managers] to suppress all fires on 
wildlands that threaten urban development, even when good forest 
management practices dictate allowing the fire to burn to reduce 
the risk of more catastrophic fires.53 
Yet we continue to build in fire-prone areas. By 2030, the fire-
prone areas of the western Rocky Mountains are expected to see the 
construction of 2.2 million new homes.54 And, once again, as with 
flooding, we see federal and state complicity in undermining effective 
disaster mitigation and prevention policies. State and local 
governments expect the federal government to throw money at fire 
suppression programs, even when subnational governments’ failure 
to exercise their constitutional regulatory authority over zoning 
increases federal fire suppression costs, which are already nearing $1 
billion annually.55 Ultimately, without federal inputs into land-use 
planning related to fire risk, we must rely on the volition of state and 
local governments and private individuals to make responsible 
residential and commercial development choices, even though these 
entities “have done little to protect themselves.”56 As a result, 
 
 50. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 6. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 41. 
 54. Id. at 43. 
 55. Id. at 44. 
 56. Id. 
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“[m]andatory zoning and building regulations may be needed to 
compel landowners to take the actions necessary to protect their 
homes and property from wildfire.”57  
One last point should be made regarding fire-related land-use 
planning. Demonstrating the generally more localized geographic 
nature of wildfires, wildfire disasters are by and large limited to much 
drier western state jurisdictions west of the 100th meridian, which 
splits the state of Texas, and the rest of the country, into a “dry” 
western half and a “wet” eastern half.58 So, while the southeastern 
United States, for example, has some of the least stringent forest 
management standards in the world,59 including lax standards related 
to fuel removal, such standards may be less necessary considering the 
reduced likelihood of fire. Even so, and especially in a time of climate 
change, fires do occur in the Southeast and may occur with 
increasing frequency. The recent wildfire in Gulf Shores, Alabama, 
for which a state of emergency was declared, resulted in requests for 
both state and federal funds to address the disaster.60 Similarly, fires 
on the “wet” side of Texas have recently burned thousands of acres 
and threatened both residents and municipalities, destroying 
hundreds of homes and taking numerous lives.61 
3. Heat waves 
Impervious surfaces and other attributes of the human-built 
environment contribute to more than just flood-related disaster 
events. Urban development in the form of rooftops, roadways, and 
parking lots can also increase the ambient temperatures of a 
location—an effect known as the “urban heat island.” The urban 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW AND POLICY 745 (2d ed. 2009).  
 59. See CONSTANCE L. MCDERMOTT, BENJAMIN CASHORE & PETER KANOWSKI, 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FOREST POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 327 (Jeffrey 
A. Sayer ed., 2010). 
 60. Libby Amos, State of Emergency Declared for Baldwin Co., FOX10TV (last updated 
June 28, 2011, 8:38 AM), http://www.fox10tv.com/dpp/news/local_news/ 
baldwin_county/state-of-emergency-declared-for-baldwin-co.  
 61. See, e.g., CNN Wire Staff, Wildfires Rip Through Sun-Scorched Texas, CNN (Sept. 5, 
2011, 10:56 PM), http://tinyurl.com/4yhby2f; 30 Homes Destroyed in Grimes County Fire, 
THE EAGLE (June 20, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://www.theeagle.com/local/30-homes-
destroyed-in-BV-fire; Matthew Watkins, Grimes County Fire Burns 5,000 Acres; Leaves ‘Total 
Devastation’, TEXAS FIRE (June 21, 2011), http://www.texas-fire.com/2011/06/grimes-
county-fire-burns-5000-acres-leaves-total-devastation/. 
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heat island effect “can elevate the temperature of ‘paved over’ urban 
areas more than twenty-two degrees Fahrenheit over surrounding 
rural areas” and “can increase the risk of heat waves, already one of 
the most deadly natural hazards.”62  
On a hot, sunny summer day, surfaces such as roofs and 
pavement can be 50 to 90 degrees Fahrenheit hotter than the 
surrounding air,63 while shaded or moist surfaces found in more rural 
settings remain close to air temperatures.64 The average difference in 
daytime surface temperatures in rural versus urban areas is 18 to 27 
degrees Fahrenheit,65 and the mean air temperature in large cities 
may be 1.8 to 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than surrounding 
undeveloped areas.66  
Urban heat islands lead to a variety of ills, including increased 
energy consumption, increased emissions of air pollutants and 
greenhouse gases, negative human health effects, and impaired water 
quality. Heat islands can lead to disaster during extreme heat waves, 
especially since increased demand for cooling may overload electrical 
generation systems. In 1995, a summer heat wave in the Midwest 
caused more than one thousand deaths.67 Indeed, the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention estimates that “from 1979 to 1999, 
excessive heat exposure contributed to more than 8,000 premature 
deaths in the United States . . . exceed[ing] the number of 
mortalities resulting from hurricanes, lightning, tornadoes, floods, 
and earthquakes combined.”68 
State and local governments may implement a variety of 
strategies to address urban heat islands. They can zone both 
commercial and residential developments to include more trees and 
vegetation. Trees help regulate temperature by trapping moisture 
 
 62. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 24 (citing EPA, Heat Island Effect, EPA.GOV (last 
updated Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/hiri/ and Kevin A. Borden & Susan L. Cutter, 
Spatial Patterns of Natural Hazards Mortality in the United States, 7 INT’L J. HEALTH 
GEOGRAPHICS 64 (2008)). 
 63. EPA, REDUCING URBAN HEAT ISLANDS: COMPENDIUM OF STRATEGIES: URBAN 
HEAT ISLAND BASICS 2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/heatisland/ 
resources/pdf/BasicsCompendium.pdf. 
 64.  Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 1. 
 67. Id. at 14 (citation omitted). 
 68. Id. at 15 (citing Extreme Heat: A Prevention Guide to Promote Your Personal Health 
and Safety, CDC (last updated July 31, 2009), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/ 
extremeheat/heat_guide.asp). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 2:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2008 
and cooling the earth’s surface.69 As a result, trees are an efficient and 
cost-effective energy conservation option, and have been called 
“nature’s air conditioners.”70 A single tree “can transpire 100 gallons 
of water from its leaves per day. The cooling provided by this 
amount of evaporation would be equivalent to five average room air 
conditioners running 20 hours per day.”71  
The average homeowner can harness the services provided by 
trees to save up to 20 percent on annual air conditioning costs.72 As 
a personal anecdote, I never considered that one type of urban 
sprawl could be so much superior to another until I moved from 
Houston, Texas to Florida. Houston has no zoning and largely no 
trees breaking the seemingly unending pavement of commercial 
parking lots, but in Florida many, if not most, municipalities require 
trees and other greenery to be incorporated into commercial 
developments. In August it makes a difference.  
One study found that cities that purposefully incorporate trees 
into land-use planning may accrue benefits of over four dollars for 
every dollar invested.73 In addition to incorporating greater amounts 
of natural capital into urban developments, state and local 
governments can implement land-use planning that incorporates 
green roofs, cool roofs, and cool pavements into commercial and 
residential developments. These emerging technologies have been 
increasingly touted as mechanisms to reduce higher temperatures 
associated with the urban heat island effect.74 
B. Perpetual Disasters 
1. Sea-level rise 
Sea-level rise is perhaps the quintessential perpetual disaster, and 
scholars have highlighted that climate change, the source of more 
rapid sea-level rise in the recent past and future, may be 
 
 69. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 58, at 1208. 
 70. TIVON E. FEELEY & PAUL H. WRAY, IOWA STATE UNIV., UNIV. EXTENSION, 
FORESTRY EXTENSION NOTES: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF WOODY VEGETATION 1 (Aug. 
2005), available at http://tinyurl.com/6pq32tl. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2. 
 73. KELAINE E. VARGAS ET AL., USDA, INTERIOR WEST COMMUNITY TREE GUIDE: 
BENEFITS, COSTS, AND STRATEGIC PLANTING 39 (2007) available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/documents/psw_gtr205/psw_gtr205.pdf. 
 74. Id. at 5. 
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characterized as nothing more than “a slow-moving disaster.”75 Sea-
level rise is indeed a slow process, and plays out incrementally over 
human life spans. Over the past century, sea levels rose .17 meters,76 
a rate of roughly 1.7 mm/year. Yet satellite imagery demonstrates 
that the rate increased to 3.1 mm/year between 1993 and 2003.77 
This increased rate corresponds with increases in atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases and temperatures; thus, the 
future impact of a changing climate on sea levels is highly variable. A 
recent report noted that “[p]rojections of sea-level rise for the 
twenty-first century vary widely, ranging from several centimeters to 
more than a meter.”78 Given increasing global temperatures and the 
rapid loss of Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets, however, these estimates 
may very well be revised upward.79 Ultimately, “warming and sea-
level rise will continue for more than a millennium, even if carbon 
dioxide concentrations are stabilized, due to the long time required 
to remove this gas from the atmosphere.”80 As a result, “rising sea 
levels . . . will ensure increased damage along increasingly developed 
shorelines,”81 as rising seas “inundate low areas and increase 
flooding, coastal erosion, wetlands loss, and saltwater intrusion into 
estuaries and freshwater aquifers.”82 Rising sea levels “interact with 
tides and storms to create more destructive impacts, as extreme high 
water levels occur with more frequency.”83  
Around fifty-eight thousand square kilometers of coastline along 
the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico lie less than 1.5 meters above 
sea level. More than 80 percent of these low-lying areas are in the 
states of Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and North Carolina, with North 
Carolina alone having as much land within one meter of sea level as 
 
 75. JOSH EAGLE & MEG CALDWELL, COASTAL LAW 31 (2011). 
 76. Christophe A.G. Tulou et al., Climate Change and the Marine Environment, in 
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 571, 575 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & 
Michael Sutton eds., 2008). 
 77. Id. 
 78. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GLOBAL 
CHANGE RESEARCH, COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MID-
ATLANTIC REGION IX (2009) [hereinafter U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM], 
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-1/final-report/default.htm#finalreport. 
 79. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 575. 
 80. Id. at 576. 
 81. Id. at 578. 
 82. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, supra note 78, at IX. 
 83. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578. 
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the Netherlands.84 In fact, “Atlantic and Gulf Coast shorelines are 
especially vulnerable to long term sea-level rise . . . the slope of these 
areas is so gentle that a small rise in sea level produces a large inland 
shift of the shoreline.”85 Eighty-five coastal counties along the east 
coast contain approximately 1,600 square kilometers of land that lie 
less than a meter above current sea levels—placing roughly 4,800 
kilometers of roads and roughly 388,000 people at risk.86 By 2060, 
coastal erosion alone will have threatened nearly 87,000 homes 
along U.S. coasts.87 A government study of the city of Boston, where 
sea levels could rise as much as a meter in the next one hundred 
years, determined that even the mildest predictions for sea-level rise 
and climate change might leave “Massachusetts General Hospital, 
the Public Garden, the Esplanade, and MIT in a pool of water after a 
strong storm surge in the harbor.”88 Without appropriate 
adjustments to land-use planning and structural requirements, flood 
damage in Boston alone would be in the ballpark of $57 billion over 
the next one hundred years, an amount $26 billion more than would 
occur without climate change and sea-level rise impacts.89 
These dangers are not limited, however, to the Gulf and Atlantic 
states. In California, a mere twelve-inch rise in sea level would shift 
flood events caused by 100-year-storm surges to once every ten 
years.90 Storm modeling along the San Diego coast found that 
without sea-level rise there would be roughly ten extreme weather 
events between 2070–2100, but “[o]ver the same time period there 
would be approximately 330 extreme events with a rise in sea level of 
twenty centimeters, 2,300 extreme events with a rise of forty 
centimeters, and almost 19,000 events with a rise of eighty 
centimeters.”91 
Sea levels rising at exponential rates (over geologic time scales) 
will meet head-on with a rush of humans heading at exponential 
rates right into the face of the disaster—an ironic scenario that 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 75, at 25. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578–79. 
 88. Susan Milligan, Study Predicts City Flood Threat Due to Warming, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 
15, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2005/02/15/ 
study_predicts_city_flood_threat_due_to_warming/. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578. 
 91. Id. 
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demonstrates the circular nature of human psychology related to 
disasters. Humans exacerbate climate change through carbon 
emissions, and as a result sea levels rise; then humans move in 
disproportionate numbers into areas likely to be inundated by rising 
sea levels; then society expects a system of disaster law and policy to 
alleviate their difficulties after disaster strikes. Over the last three 
decades, nearly half of all new construction in the United States has 
been in the coastal zone,92 and approximately 53 percent of the total 
U.S. population lives on the 17 percent of land in the coastal zone.93 
By 2000, counties along the coast had more than four times the 
population density of counties further inland.94 By 2020 an 
additional twenty-seven million people are expected to call the coast 
home.95  
Ultimately, sea-level rise is a prime example of a slow-moving but 
perpetual disaster that has broad interjurisdictional and nationwide 
impacts, and one that synergizes with other disasters like hurricanes 
and flood events to wreak havoc on the human-built environment—
especially in the absence of innovative and responsible land-use 
planning. In fact, perpetual disasters are arguably even more 
dangerous than transitory disasters, at least in the sense of failing to 
spur human action. The full magnitude of harm becomes apparent 
and observable only when temporally aggregated and spread out 
over periods of time that exceed any single generation’s life span. As 
a result, it is difficult to forge collective action to avoid the disaster. 
As Professor Buzbee has noted, “[a] sudden disaster or perceived 
crisis is often essential to rouse the populace and give politicians 
reasons to take on issues of harms caused by industry and the process 
of real estate development.”96 Yet perpetual disasters are by 
definition not “sudden,” thus masking the crisis. As discussed next, 
 
 92. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 308. 
 93. EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 75, at 25. 
 94. Id. at 33. 
 95. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 311. Sea-level rise is not only a slow-moving disaster 
threatening humans and human-made capital; it also threatens important ecosystems already 
under strain. Eleven of the twenty-five most endangered ecosystems in the United States are 
coastal ecosystems. REED F. NOSS, EDWARD T. LAROE III. & J. MICHAEL SCOTT, 
ENDANGERED ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF LOSS 
AND DEGRADATION (1995), http://biology.usgs.gov/pubs/ecosys.htm. 
 96. William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional 
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 129–130 (1999). 
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nonpoint pollution of vast watersheds like the Mississippi River 
Valley provides yet another example of a slow-moving disaster. 
2. Gulf/bay pollution and eutrophication from nonpoint runoff 
Nonpoint source water pollution from land-use-related 
agricultural activities “is now considered the nation’s most persistent 
and most difficult water quality problem.”97 Over 1.9 million U.S. 
farms cover nearly half of all the land in the nation.98 In 1998, 
agricultural runoff was a primary contributor to the degradation of 
59 percent of river miles, 31 percent of impaired lake waters, and 15 
percent of impaired estuarine waters.99 Sedimentation, toxic 
chemicals such as Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), mercury, 
pesticides, hydrocarbons, and, of course, excess fertilizers and animal 
wastes containing nitrogen and phosphorus plague waters in these 
watersheds.100 The interjurisdictional impacts are profound. 
Nonpoint runoff from agricultural, construction, forestry, and urban 
development activities sends sediment downstream that results in 
dredging costs of $1 billion a year for harbors and reservoirs.101 In 
addition to the Gulf dead zone highlighted in the introduction, 
nearly half of all estuaries in the United States contain hypoxic zones 
due to phosphorus and nitrogen pollution.102 Nonpoint runoff 
aggregates at its final point of destination to destroy coral reefs and 
poison fisheries either directly or through the process of 
bioaccumulation.103 There are further biological vector impacts, as 
runoff has resulted in the outbreak of microorganisms that attack 
and kill both fish and humans in the Chesapeake Bay, the Neuse 
River of North Carolina, and the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
watershed.104 
Despite widespread interjurisdictional impacts and the 
nationwide concerns raised by nonpoint water pollution, the federal 
government does not regulate agricultural nonpoint source water 
 
 97. Williams, supra note 9, at 22. 
 98. Id. at 44. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 46. 
 101. Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint 
Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 179, 213 (2000). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 58, at 456.  
 104. Craig, supra note 101, at 214. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 2:51 PM 
1991 Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism 
 2013 
pollution under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Again, this hesitancy is 
due in part to conceptions of exclusive state and local authority over 
land uses,105 leaving states as the “exclusive regulators of nonpoint 
source pollution.”106 States, meanwhile, are doing very little to 
exercise their regulatory authority.107 As Professor Craig has noted, 
“[s]o long as Congress operates within constitutional federalism 
requirements, its statutory judgment calls are subject to revision if 
new information or awareness indicates that the initial statutory 
division of power incorrectly reflects the true balance of the national 
and local interests at stake.”108 The CWA’s point source/nonpoint 
source distinction constitutes one such potential misjudgment, as the 
interstate commercial impacts of nonpoint water pollution are 
becoming ever clearer, thus rendering a point source/nonpoint 
source distinction increasingly inconsequential under Commerce 
Clause analysis.  
Though the CWA does contain nonprescriptive provisions that 
might be harnessed to address or encourage greater control over 
nonpoint pollution,109 neither the CWA nor other programs have 
“translated into either widespread demonstrable results or clearly 
defined, coherent regulatory programs,” leading to calls for an 
increased federal presence in the form of minimum federal standards 
with a great degree of flexibility available to the states in 
implementation.110 Such standards would address the problem of 
state-level inaction as well as foster more efficient coordination 
considering the large-scale interjurisdictional impacts along 
watersheds like the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico.111 To the 
extent that such standards might involve greater federal inputs into 
state land-use planning within potentially affected watersheds, it is 
necessary to consider a reconstitution of federalism principles. 
 
 105. See Williams, supra note 9, at 27 (“The practices that contribute most to nonpoint 
source pollution are patterns of land use, the control of which has been guarded jealously by 
local government authorities, making direct federal control at best a touchy political 
proposition. Current federal programs to control nonpoint source pollution are the product of 
judgments that controls of this sort should remain with state and local authorities, as has been 
the traditional practice.” (footnote omitted)). 
 106. See Craig, supra note 101, at 179. 
 107. Williams, supra note 9, at 23. 
 108. Craig, supra note 101, at 181. 
 109. See Williams, supra note 9, at 67–91. 
 110. Id. at 25–29. 
 111. Id. 
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3. Invasive species  
At first blush, invasive species may not seem like a perpetual 
disaster. Yet, the persistent rates at which invasive species spread and 
their wide-scale interjurisdictional economic and other impacts justify 
this categorization under many circumstances. Estimates in the year 
2000 were that the United States suffers $137 billion a year in 
agricultural losses, infrastructure damage, management, and other 
costs associated with invasive species.112 The estimated cost of 
managing just one invasive species, zebra mussels, in the Great Lakes 
between 2000 and 2010 was nearly $5 billion.113 Invasive species 
also exacerbate other categories and types of disaster, such as 
transitory fires. For example, Tucson, Arizona, has experienced 
increased invasion from nonnative vegetation that has 
“transform[ed] fire-resistant desert into highly flammable 
grassland.”114  
Invasive species not only wreak havoc on human development 
activities, but also give rise to a variety of natural capital costs. Up to 
46 percent of plants and animals listed on the Endangered Species 
Act have been negatively impacted by invasives.115 Furthermore, 
invasive species’ interjurisdictional scope is profound. Invasive plants 
alone infest 100 million acres in the United States, and each year 
they spread an additional 3 million acres.116  
President Clinton issued an executive order in 1999 establishing 
a National Invasive Species Council.117 In 2000, the regulatory 
agencies that make up the council spent approximately $632 million 
to combat invasive species.118 Though the federal and state 
governments and international forums have set their sights on 
invasive species through a variety of legislative and other programs 
 
 112. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, MEETING THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE 
8 (2001), available at http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/docs/council/mpfinal.pdf; Flynn 
Boonstra, Note, Leading by Example: A Comparison of New Zealand's and the United States' 
Invasive Species Policies, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2011). A single species of termite 
costs the city of New Orleans $300 million annually. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, 
supra, at 2. 
 113. Jason A. Boothe, Comment, Defending the Homeland: A Call to Action in the War 
Against Aquatic Invasive Species, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 407, 412 (2008). 
 114. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 6–7. 
 115. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, supra note 112, at 2. 
 116. Id. at 11. 
 117. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183, 6184 (1999). 
 118. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, supra note 112, at 18. 
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dating at least as far back as the Lacey Act of 1900,119 problems 
persist and appear to be getting worse.120  
Some invasive species implicate land-use planning that currently 
falls within the exclusive regulatory ambit of state and local 
governments, like the crafting of private forest management 
standards.121 Exclusive state regulatory control over such standards 
gives further cause for concern, as most states have been unable to 
formulate robust approaches to managing the entire suite of invasive 
species that pose threats to the country.122 This indicates that greater 
federal inputs may be needed to address the problems associated 
with widespread and extremely destructive invasive species. 
An example of such a species is cogongrass, which has gripped 
the southeastern United States. Cogongrass is “an aggressive invader 
of natural and disturbed areas throughout the Southeast. It disrupts 
ecosystem functions, reduces wildlife habitat, decreases tree seedling 
growth and establishment success, and alters fire regimes and 
intensity.”123 Scientists have noted that the grass has placed the 
southeastern United States in a “crisis.”124 Over one million acres of 
the state of Florida is plagued by cogongrass, with tens of thousands 
more acres present in each of six other states. The grass spreads at a 
rate of thousands of additional acres each year.125 Most of the 
Eastern United States and even the Pacific Northwest states are 
considered vulnerable to its spread. Scientists have argued that “[t]he 
invasion of cogongrass appears facilitated by dynamics in this era of 
rapid global warming, increased air pollution with higher carbon 
dioxide levels, human encroachment with wildland fragmentation, 
and solidifying urbanization with a population indifferent to the land 
base that supports them. These conditions favor cogongrass 
 
 119. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2006); see also National Invasive Species Act, 16 
U.S.C.A. §§ 4701–4715 (West 2010) (this act, however, is very limited in scope); 3 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 21:7 (2011). 
 120.  NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, supra note 112, at 10–12. 
 121. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Boonstra, supra note 112, at 1200–07. 
 123. C.W. EVANS ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., FIELD GUIDE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
COGONGRASS: WITH COMPARISON TO OTHER COMMONLY FOUND GRASS SPECIES IN THE 
SOUTHEAST (2006), available at http://www.cogongrass.org/cogongrassid.pdf. 
 124. James H. Miller, The Context of the South’s Cogongrass Crisis, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE REGIONAL COGONGRASS CONFERENCE: A COGONGRASS MANAGEMENT GUIDE 6, 6 
(Nancy J. Loewenstein & James H. Miller eds., 2007) [hereinafter COGONGRASS 
CONFERENCE]. 
 125. Id. 
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invasions.”126 Scholars have called for invasive species management 
plans to be formulated in every state to prevent spread of the grass,127 
especially considering that “[t]he invasion of cogongrass into the 
Southern United States has replaced the forest fire as the greatest 
perceived threat to biodiversity, land use[] practices and land 
values.”128 
Cogongrass is spread through many vectors, including 
contaminated forestry equipment used for site preparation, tree 
planting and extraction, and other forest management activities.129 
The impacts on private forestry can be profound. Controlled burn 
activities are important to forest health, not only to prevent more 
catastrophic fires, but also to maintain the overall health of the 
forest. Cogongrass, however, burns so hot that not only does it 
increase the risk of fire disasters for surrounding communities, but it 
can actually kill trees present on burned sites.130 Scholars have noted 
that “[c]ogongrass fires are very intense and hot, with little above 
ground vegetation able to survive. . . . Fires from cogongrass are 
typically 15 to 20% hotter and more intense than natural fires in 
pine-based ecosystems in the Southern U.S.”131 In addition, once the 
grass takes hold, species biodiversity in the ecosystem drops to 
extremely low levels.132 
These impacts on private forest management activities in the 
South are potentially devastating. Eighty-six percent of southeastern 
forests are privately owned,133 and “[u]nder the U.S. Constitution, 
the federal government has limited authority and responsibility; all 
other powers are reserved for the states. [Private] [f]orestland 
management and use was one such reserved power.”134 While state 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 8. 
 128. Lee Atkins, Operational Considerations for Control of Cogongrass, in COGONGRASS 
CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 38, 38. 
 129. David J. Moorhead & Charles T. Bargeron, Cogongrass Distribution and Spread 
Prevention, in COGONGRASS CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 24, 25. 
 130. See Gregory E. MacDonald, Cogongrass (Imperata cylindrical): Biology, Distribution 
and Impacts in the Southeastern U.S., in COGONGRASS CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 10, 
12. 
 131. Id.  
 132. See Miller, supra note 124, at 7. 
 133. DAVID N. WEAR & JOHN G. GREIS, U.S. FOREST SERV., THE SOUTHERN FOREST 
FUTURES PROJECT: SUMMARY REPORT 58 (May 12, 2011), http:// 
http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/reports/draft/summary_report.pdf. 
 134. Gerald A. Rose et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the US, in THE POLITICS 
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and local governments maintain constitutional authority to regulate 
private forest management, in the southeastern United States 
especially, states maintain some of the most lax regulatory standards 
in the world.135 Cogongrass’s threat to southern forestry is of critical 
importance as the timber production sector in the South contributed 
more than one million jobs and $51 billion in employee 
compensation in 2009.136 Indeed, southern forests are the most 
intensively managed forests in the United States,137 and a majority of 
U.S. lumber is harvested from southern forests.138 Remarkably, 
“since 1986, if the South were compared with any other country, 
none would produce more timber than this one region of the United 
States.”139 As a result of the perpetual spread of an invasive species 
like cogongrass across the southeastern United States, having 
profound interjurisdictional economic and environmental impact, 
greater coordination provided by federal minimum standards may be 
warranted to stave off a worsening disaster—even if such standards 
intrude into traditional areas of state and local constitutional 
regulatory authority.  
C. Variables in the “Gray Area” of the Spectrum: Disaster Frequency 
and Durational Impact 
A variety of disasters exist in the gray area of the transitory-
perpetual spectrum. These disasters do not neatly fall into one 
category or the other because their frequency or durational impact or 
both may cause them to take on the characteristics of both transitory 
and perpetual disasters. Given their potential to take on the 
characteristics of perpetual disasters, however, disasters in this area 
may not only warrant greater federal inputs into land-use policy, but 
if those inputs take the “top-down” form of federal minimum 
standards, they may also be more constitutionally viable than they 
would be for transitory disasters. 
 
OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE 238, 239 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & 
Doris Capistrano eds., 2005). See also JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 849 
(2006).  
 135. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 59. 
 136. WEAR & GREIS, supra note 133, at 17. 
 137. Id. at 29. 
 138. Id. at 5.  
 139. Id. at 17.  
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1. Frequency—gulf hurricanes and Mississippi River Valley flooding 
Some disasters may technically be transitory, in that there is a 
temporal break between disaster events, but they can occur so 
frequently as to mimic the continual and wide-scale effects of 
perpetual disasters. Frequency can be so great over a period of time 
that these disasters warrant greater national interest relative to the 
localities in which destruction occurs. A couple of examples are 
illustrative—Gulf hurricanes and flooding of the Mississippi River 
Valley. In fact, the land-use planning issues implicated by these types 
of disaster are quite related. Research has demonstrated that “[i]n 
the United States, development in our Midwestern river valleys and 
our Gulf Coast is removing the Gulf Coast wetlands at a rate of two 
football fields every hour, bringing storms and the ocean ever 
closer”140—a state of affairs which exacerbates the destruction caused 
by both hurricanes and flooding. 
Gulf hurricanes primarily implicate land-use planning by creating 
other disasters, such as severe flood events. When residential and 
commercial developments are located in flood-prone areas, hurricane 
related costs, both economic and human, are greater. The recurrence 
of hurricanes in the Gulf over decades, where every few years a state 
of emergency is declared in one or more states, indicates that 
transboundary and even nationwide harms are occurring on wide 
scales. The aggregated state and local land-use planning related to 
flood zones becomes of much greater national-level concern during 
hurricane events. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that low-lying 
coastal lands, for instance, “are already vulnerable to erosion, 
flooding, storm surges, and tsunamis; and poor development 
planning has placed trillions of dollars worth of building and 
infrastructure directly in the path of these threats.”141  
It is not only land-use planning that places urban development in 
floodplains, however, which exacerbates the damage caused by 
hurricanes. The state of Louisiana is losing 6600 acres of coastal 
wetlands per year—wetlands that are a natural hurricane disaster 
mitigation resource.142 Though some of this loss is naturally 
 
 140. CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES 
TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 39 (2007). 
 141. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578. 
 142. ROBERT VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A 
POST-KATRINA WORLD 19 (2010). 
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occurring, “the real culprits are human-made” and include not only 
commercial and residential development of floodplains, but also 
levees, navigational channels, and oil-and-gas infrastructure that have 
“accelerate[d] coastal land loss by reducing the natural flow of the 
[Mississippi] [R]iver’s freshwater and sediment to wetland areas, 
where the lost land would then naturally be replenished.”143 Instead 
of maintaining wetlands, that sediment travels down the Mississippi 
and out into the Gulf as far as the outer continental shelf where it 
cannot naturally form important barrier islands.144 These wetlands 
could have prevented much of Katrina’s damage in New Orleans by 
acting as a sponge for the storm surge. Other hurricane-prone states 
face similarly staggering numbers of wetland loss. Over the last 
fifteen years, Florida has lost 84,000 acres of wetlands to urban 
development, or “subdivisions and strip malls”—a rate of 5600 acres 
a year.145 Yet, even after the destruction wrought by Katrina, Florida 
is the only Gulf Coast state to implement comprehensive planning 
that requires local disaster mitigation plans.146  
Despite the land-use-driven destruction of wetlands, both the 
state and federal governments have failed to formulate a plan for 
changing the status quo. After New Orleans experienced the near 
miss of Hurricane Georges in 1998, a $14 billion wetlands 
restoration plan was drawn up, but Congress and the Bush 
administration balked at the proposal.147 After another near miss 
from Hurricane Ivan and another balk on the project by Congress, a 
member of the Louisiana governor’s office queried, “What is it going 
to take for Congress and the president to realize this is not just 
another project? Would we have had to get hit by the big one? Who 
wants to wait for that? Surely it shouldn’t have to take loss of life, 
does it?”148 The next year, Hurricane Katrina killed at least 1800 
people and cost over $81 billion in damages.149 While wetlands 
 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Matthew Waite & Craig Pittman, Louisiana Wetlands Serve as Warning, Experts Say, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at A10, available at http://www.sptimes.com/ 
2005/09/05/Worldandnation/Katrina_offers_lesson.shtml. 
 146. Berke & Campanella, supra note 49, at 201. 
 147. Waite & Pittman, supra note 145. 
 148. Id. 
 149. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NOAA, TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE 
KATRINA, 23–30 AUGUST 2005 at 11, 12 (last updated Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. 
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restoration and smarter development planning would not have 
alleviated all of those deaths or economic costs, the $14 billion cost 
of the wetlands restoration seems like a bargain compared to the $81 
billion in damages wrought by Katrina. 
Ultimately, hurricanes occur with such frequency, over such 
broad scales, and with such significant national impact that even 
though they are temporal, their recurrence justifies greater federal 
inputs into mitigatory land-use planning. This is especially the case 
considering that hurricanes are expected to become both more 
frequent and more intense as climate change contributes to warmer 
oceans.150 
Flooding along vast watersheds like the Mississippi River Valley 
also occurs with both frequency and large scale interjurisdictional 
effects. The Mississippi River floods of 1993 were the result of a cold 
winter followed by a wet spring, leaving nine states inundated—
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, 
Missouri, Wisconsin, and Illinois.151 In total, fifty people died, $15 
billion of damage occurred, a full seventy-five towns were 
“completely under floodwaters,” and ten thousand homes were 
destroyed.152 
Rather than seek regulatory or other inputs into state and local 
land-use planning in the region, the federal government spent $1 
billion in a “voluntary buyout program designed to return 
floodplains to their natural state, while some states did heighten 
land-use standards restricting floodplain development.”153 As 
discussed in Part II.A.1 above, however, Missouri was not one of 
those states. Indeed, as of 2003, only nine states nationwide 
maintained regulations prohibiting construction of certain “critical 
facilities,” such as hospitals, water treatment plants, and emergency 
centers, within floodplains.154 
As scholars have noted, attacking the primary driver of 
Mississippi watershed flooding is a particularly difficult task because 
policymakers “are faced with a land-use planning system that is so 
 
 150. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578. More frequent and intense Category 4 and 5 
storms have occurred over the past thirty years, a trend “directly linked to increases in sea-
surface temperatures.” Id.  
 151. PERROW, supra note 140, at 18. 
 152. Id. 
 153. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 34. 
 154. Id. at 36. 
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fragmented that concerted, coordinated actions between various 
actors across all levels of government are severely hindered.”155 
Regional watershed managers during the Missouri floods dealt with 
“no fewer than 6 separate federal agencies, 23 state agencies spread 
across 5 states, and over 233 municipalities.”156 The inability of 
fragmented jurisdictions to coordinate mitigation efforts against a 
single, highly devastating, but relatively frequent event like a 
Mississippi Valley flood demonstrates a need for greater federal 
inputs into land-use planning along watersheds in the valley. 
2. Durational Impact—nuclear plant incident and the “Big One” 
earthquake 
Some disasters may only occur once, or far less frequently than 
do “pure” transitory disasters, but the long-term, interjurisdictional, 
nationwide durational impact is of a tremendous magnitude. A major 
earthquake or a nuclear facility incident would be examples. These 
disasters operate for a conceptually severed period of time just like 
perpetual disasters, primarily due to the long-lasting, continual 
nature of their after-effects.  
The recent East Coast earthquake, with an epicenter in 
Richmond, Virginia, could be felt along a stretch from Georgia to 
Maine.157 The damage could have been far worse. Yet, perhaps 
symbolic of both the infrequency of eastern earthquakes as well as 
the fragility of national interests during times of disaster, the 
Washington Monument was closed indefinitely until repairs could be 
made to the structural damage caused by the quake.158  
As Farber et al. note, in 2001 the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) identified the three most likely 
catastrophes to hit the United States: a major earthquake along the 
San Andreas fault, a terrorist attack on New York City, and a major 
hurricane hitting New Orleans—the latter two have already 
occurred, of course.159 Though predictions are difficult, the “big 
 
 155. Damien Leonard, Comment, Raising the Levee: Dutch Land Use Law as a Model for 
U.S. Adaptation to Climate Change, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 555 (2009). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Katharine Q. Seelye, Above All Else, Eastern Quake Rattles Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
24, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/us/ 
24quake.html?pagewanted=all. 
 158. Id. 
 159. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39. 
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one” is expected within decades160 and there is a “greater than 99 
percent chance that a 6.7-magnitude earthquake will strike one of 
California’s many major faults in the next thirty years.”161 A quake 
the size of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake could kill between 
800 and 3400 people, seriously injure between 4000 and 12,500 
people, leave 400,000 to 600,000 people homeless, and result in 
economic losses of between $93 billion and $120 billion.162 Land-
use decisions made by the municipal government just after the 1906 
San Francisco earthquake actually made potential destruction from a 
future quake far more severe.163 To remedy this problem, the state of 
California passed legislation in the 1970s to prevent the building of 
residential structures along faults and to authorize local governments 
to implement stricter zoning standards. Many local governments 
have acted upon that authority.164  
Charles Perrow argues that a primary reason for the city of Los 
Angeles’ “vulnerability” to a major earthquake is the fact that the 
Community Redevelopment Authority, appointed by the mayor, is 
“largely composed of businessmen, and able to designate 
development areas . . .” and includes members of the chemical 
industry.165 As a result, the area maintains the second-highest 
concentration of chemical facilities in the United States, many 
located along earthquake faults.166 Perrow asserts,  
Why they were built there in the first place and allowed to expand, 
since the hazards were known and risky areas identified many 
decades ago, is an important question. The answer appears to be 
economic pressures on the political representatives responsible for 
overseeing decisions about site selection, protection, and the 
enforcement of regulations. Market forces are allowed to control 
growth, but there seems to be a market failure for preventing or 
mitigating low-probability/high-consequence accidents.167 
Now certainly earthquakes may be localized in nature and more 
appropriately categorized as transitory in some circumstances. Yet, as 
 
 160. PERROW, supra note 140, at 33. 
 161. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 40. 
 164. Id. at 40–41. 
 165. PERROW, supra note 140, at 34. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 35. 
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with recurring hurricanes in the Gulf, the occurrence of a 
catastrophic earthquake on the San Andreas Fault is only a matter of 
time and the nationwide impacts would be profound. Perhaps under 
such circumstances the federal government should have an increased 
role in land-use planning in the region as a means of mitigating that 
eventuality and also reducing its own inevitable expenditures 
associated with disaster relief. 
The recent East Coast earthquake actually highlighted one of the 
threats posed by land-use planning associated with the siting of 
nuclear power plants. Though the North Anna station accrued no 
structural damage, just northwest of Richmond, Virginia, the reactor 
was temporarily shut down.168 Twelve other plants “felt” the quake 
but did not shut down.169 Concerns that a Fukushima-like disaster 
could occur were immediately raised.170 The Fukushima nuclear plant 
in Japan was crippled by this year’s devastating tsunami, itself 
triggered by an earthquake, and the meltdown of reactors released 
radiation, traces of which traveled all the way to the United States.171 
The damage could take years to clean up.172  
Earthquakes are not the only disaster that could give rise to a 
nuclear disaster. Hurricanes also pose a threat to nuclear facilities. 
Recently, Hurricane Irene slogged along a path that threatened more 
than a dozen nuclear plants along the East Coast.173 None of them 
lost power to their reactors, though two reactors were taken offline 
because of the storm—a New Jersey nuclear plant for precautionary 
reasons and a Maryland plant after debris generated by the hurricane 
 
 168. Rebecca Smith, Earthquake Triggers Reactor-Design Review, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 
2011, at A3, available at http://tinyurl.com/897u7jx (subscription required). 
 169. Matthew L. Wald, 13 Plants Felt Earthquake, But Reactors Were Spared, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/ 
science/earth/26nuclear.html?_r=1&ref=earth.  
 170. Tom Hamburger & Melanie Mason, East Coast’s Quake Rekindles Debate on 
Nuclear Plant Safety, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2011, at A20, available at 
http://tinyurl.com/3awu9hu. 
 171. CNN Wire Staff, Japan’s Nuclear Contamination Spreads to More U.S. States, CNN 
HEALTH (Mar. 29, 2011, 5:46 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/03/28/ 
radiation.us/index.html. 
 172. John M. Glionna, Japan Says Nuclear Plant Has Stabilized, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 
2011, at A3, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-japan-
fukushima-20110721,0,730227.story. 
 173. Julie Johnsson, U.S. Nuclear Reactors Weather Irene Without Losing Power; One Goes 
Offline, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
08-28/u-s-nuclear-reactors-weather-hurricane-irene-safely-without-losing-power.html. 
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damaged the plant and triggered an automatic shutdown.174 At the 
Maryland plant, Irene hurled a piece of aluminum siding into the 
primary transformer on the site.175 
As these examples illustrate, the placement of a nuclear facility is 
of critical importance in order to mitigate risk if a nuclear incident 
occurs, especially in earthquake- and hurricane-prone zones. New 
nuclear facilities are not sited with anything approaching regularity. 
In addition, because the federal government generally maintains 
preemptive regulatory control over nuclear energy in the United 
States, the federal government already has a say in land-use planning 
related to such facilities since the federal government may simply 
refuse to permit a facility in the first instance.176 The federal 
government, however, would be wise to wield this authority 
responsibly in order to mitigate and prevent both the risk of and 
ensuing damage from a nuclear incident. 
D. Implications of the Transitory-Perpetual Disaster Spectrum 
Categorization 
The above categorizations are not meant to be exact or mutually 
exclusive. Rather, the categories are merely meant to begin a more 
holistic discussion of land-use-related disaster mitigation and 
prevention, and to provide a framework within which to analyze 
both which types of disaster require greater federal inputs as well as 
how those inputs might best be achieved, including consideration of 
the constitutionality of alternatives. Ultimately, land-use policies 
related to perpetual and “gray area” disasters like sea-level rise, 
nonpoint runoff, certain invasive species, Mississippi River Valley 
flooding, Gulf hurricanes, nuclear incidents, and the “big one” 
earthquake need greater federal inputs to forge effective disaster 
mitigation and prevention. Even though bilateral and horizontal 
mechanisms should certainly be utilized to supplement any top-
down mechanism, some form of top-down regulatory inputs may be 
needed due to the national interests at stake, the significant inter-
jurisdictional effects, and the costs the federal government would 
otherwise incur in post-disaster relief. As demonstrated in Figure 1, as 
 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. 
 176. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Preemption Issues Under Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, §§ 1 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011 et seq., 198 A.L.R. FED. 147, at § 6[a] (2004).  
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well as in the next Part, these top-down inputs might also be more 
constitutionally viable than they would be for “pure” transitory 
disasters like wildfires, localized flooding, and heat waves—disasters 
for which they would also be less necessary. Those types of pure 
transitory disasters are perhaps best addressed through bilateral or 
horizontal means in order to avoid any constitutional federalism 
complications. 
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III. MECHANISMS OF RECONSTITUTING FEDERALISM WITHIN THE 
BIMODAL FEDERALISM FRAMEWORK 
Over the long term, the most straightforward and cost-effective strategy 
to minimize or prevent damages and losses from natural hazards is to 
guide development away from hazard-prone areas.177 
 
It seems that state and local governments are doing little in the 
way of guiding development out of disaster-prone areas, and indeed 
are actively promoting that development. The federal government is 
also incentivizing development of disaster-prone areas through 
disaster relief, the tax code, housing and small business grants and 
loans, insurance schemes, and a variety of other policies aimed at 
promoting economic growth at the expense of long-term human, 
economic, and environmental welfare. Thus, both national and 
subnational governments must adjust policy decisions that exacerbate 
the costs of disaster events.178 Aside from those policy choices, 
however, what about the institutions that facilitate these decisions? 
What about constitutional federalism? What if the federal 
government needs to maintain greater inputs into subnational land-
use planning related to disaster mitigation and prevention, and 
garners the political will to do so, but is constitutionally constrained 
 
 177. Anna K. Schwab & David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards: 
Obstacles and Opportunities for Local Governments Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, 
in LOSING GROUND: A NATION ON EDGE 287 (John R. Nolon & Daniel B. Rodriguez eds., 
2007) (citation omitted).  
 178. Indeed, political will is an “important obstacle” to local adoption of stricter land- 
use controls because 
[f]ew local governments are willing to reduce natural hazards by managing 
development. It is not so much that they oppose land-use measures (although some 
do), but rather that, like individuals, they tend to view natural hazards as a minor 
problem that can take a back seat to more pressing local concerns . . . . Also, the 
costs of mitigation are immediate while the benefits are uncertain, do not occur 
during the tenure of current elected officials, and are not visible . . . . In addition, 
property rights lobbies are growing stronger. All of these factors contribute to a lack 
of political leadership for limiting land use in hazardous areas. 
DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 160 (1999). What Professor Mileti is describing is a tragedy of the commons 
whereby state governments take on the characteristics of “rational herders” appropriating 
depletable resources (the land base, the services provided by the natural capital replaced by 
human-made capital, etc.), where in the absence of state or federal requirements it is 
exceedingly difficult to exclude any one local government from appropriating such resources. 
See Hudson, supra note 17. 
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in those efforts?179 This Part deals with these questions—detailing 
how the federal government may gain greater inputs into land-use 
planning related to certain disasters and how those inputs might best 
be achieved. To be clear, as detailed below, this is not to say that the 
federal government will displace state and local authority to act.180 
Rather, this section explores the best mechanisms for the federal 
government to act as a “fail-safe”181 in the event that state and local 
governments do not act. As Professor Buzbee described,  
The historical division of authority among federal, state, and local 
governments is not a historical accident, but has largely arisen as a 
result of the relative institutional competence of each level of 
government in addressing particular social needs. The optimal mix 
of federal, state, and local regulatory roles, however, inevitably 
changes over time as technological, environmental, market, and 
political changes occur.182 
This Part analyzes the best mechanisms to utilize for striking this 
optimal mix from the perspective of both yielding results and 
considering questions of constitutionality. Furthermore, these 
mechanisms are discussed in the context of a new theory of 
“Bimodal Federalism,” which acknowledges within the same 
 
 179. Some commentators have recently argued for a greater federal presence as a general 
matter: 
We need a more centralized regulatory system. Local initiative is simply not reliable 
in the case of mitigation. Localities are reluctant to enforce state standards, national 
standards are few, and enforcement is lax. This is an area where centralized 
regulation—standards and enforcement—is needed; given the political influence of 
growth-oriented city officials and property and building interests, there is bound to 
be a “failure” of the private market. 
PERROW, supra note 140, at 37.  
 180. Professor Buzbee has argued that 
[t]he limited federal role in encouraging or prohibiting particular urban forms or 
types of land use is the result of historical traditions and constitutionally limited 
grants of authority to the federal government. Virtually all scholarly examinations of 
sprawl and suburbanization trends point out, however, that federal laws and 
regulations have already influenced metropolitan growth patterns. Thus, an 
increased federal role seeking to address or to deter sprawl or its ills would 
constitute a change in federal policy, but would not constitute a wholly new entry 
into fields of law and regulation influencing urban form. Recent decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court make less likely any substantial expansion of federal 
authority to displace state and local land-use decisionmaking.  
Buzbee, supra note 96, at 98. 
 181. See Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S. and 
Canadian Forest Policy, 44 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  
 182. Buzbee, supra note 96, at 94. 
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framework the seemingly irreconcilable conceptions of federalism as 
defined by dynamic and dualistic theories of federalism. 
A. The Bimodal Federalism Framework: Integrating Dynamic 
Federalism with Remnants of Dual Federalism 
A significant tension exists in scholarly debates over the 
constitutional workings of U.S. federalism, particularly in the 
environmental and land-use context. As explained below, this 
tension centers around normative, interpretive, and descriptive 
analyses of two different modes of federalism in operation in the 
United States today—“dynamic federalism” and “dual federalism”—
as well as an apparent presumption that either one or the other is the 
correct theoretical descriptor of U.S. federalism. Theories of dual 
federalism posit that “the states and the federal government inhabit[] 
mutually exclusive spheres of power,”183 while dynamic federalism 
“rejects any conception of federalism that separates federal and state 
authority under the dualist notion that the states need a sphere of 
authority protected from the influence of the federal government” 
and posits that “federal and state governments function as alternative 
centers of power and any matter is presumptively within the 
authority of both the federal and the state governments.”184 Both 
dynamic and dual federalism involve normative, interpretive, and 
descriptive claims about not only the proper operation of U.S. 
federalism, but also about how U.S. federalism operates in fact.  
Yet, neither of these theories in isolation provides an accurate 
descriptive picture of the actual operation of U.S. federalism today. 
Based upon these definitions, it is true that dynamic federalism may 
be a more accurate interpretation of how many, if not most, federal-
state regulatory interactions occur—especially in the modern 
regulatory state. We may even be witnessing a transition from dual 
operations of federalism to dynamic ones regarding a wide array of 
subject matters. In the environmental and land-use context, dynamic 
federalism may also be the more appropriate normative theory of 
federalism to achieve successful legal and policy results on the 
ground. Yet, regarding certain regulatory subjects, remnants of dual 
federalism remain, and these remnants also form an integral part of 
 
 183. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental 
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 175 (2006). 
 184. Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
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the current scope of U.S. constitutional federalism.185 An example is 
direct land-use regulation, where strong notions that “states need a 
sphere of authority protected from the influence of the federal 
government” do in fact remain, regardless of normative claims that 
states do not need a separate sphere.186 These remnants of dual 
federalism should not be ignored in analysis and application of 
modern federalism theory or in proposed solutions to federalism 
conflicts. The following discussion demonstrates how the full scope 
of U.S. federalism theory may be thought of as increasingly 
integrating principles of dynamic federalism in combination with as- 
of-yet unresolved principles of dual federalism. This integrated view 
of federalism is a theory of “Bimodal Federalism” that seeks to 
recognize federalism as it in fact operates in the context of present 
day constitutional scholarly debates and jurisprudence. The word 
“bimodal” simply means “having or providing two modes, methods, 
[or] systems.”187 Thus, bimodal federalism analysis takes federalism 
at face value today and includes application of federalism principles 
that might fall under either the dynamic or the dual mode of 
federalism. 
Dynamic federalism theory questions the previously held 
federalism assumptions that “regulatory authority to address 
environmental ills should be allocated to one or the other level of 
government with minimal overlap.”188 Professor Engel has argued 
that 
a static allocation of authority between the state and federal 
government is inconsistent with the process of policymaking in our 
federal system, in which multiple levels of government interact in 
the regulatory process. Absent constitutional changes that would 
 
 185. As Professor Schapiro has noted, “the basic conception of federalism continues to be 
a system of independent national and state governments that must be protected from each 
other,” and “[d]ualist conceptions survive” in some areas. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a 
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005). Even so, this Article does 
not seek to make normative claims about how dynamic U.S. federalism should be from a 
constitutional perspective or to argue that there are or are not separate dualist spheres of 
governance. Rather, the Article simply recognizes that the debate is being waged and as a 
result legislative and policy responses should be sensitive to the current constitutional reality—a 
reality that jurisprudentially may very well result in continued judicial carve-outs of separate 
spheres of governance for the federal or state governments. 
 186.  Engel, supra note 183, at 176. 
 187. Bimodal Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/bimodal (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
 188. Engel, supra note 183, at 161. 
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lock in a specific allocation of authority, broad, overlapping 
authority between levels of government may be essential to 
prompting regulatory activity at the preferred level of 
government.189 
Dynamic federalism recognizes the importance of non-static 
allocations of regulatory authority in federal systems and “conceives 
the states and the federal government as alternative—not mutually 
exclusive—sources of regulatory authority.”190 The practical 
application of dynamic federalism is in crafting federal legislative 
solutions that allow subnational governments flexibility to regulate 
within a “standards framework” provided by the federal government, 
such that, for example, “where national uniformity is desired, 
Congress might allow for the development of a single standard by 
the states themselves, as opposed to the imposition of a standard by 
the federal government.”191 In other words, the federal government 
might set a target, limit, or other regulatory goal and allow 
subnational governments the ability to take into account local 
considerations when designing mechanisms to achieve that target or 
limit. That is, after all, one of the primary justifications for a 
decentralized form of federal governance.192 Furthermore, 
interaction between levels of government “can lead either, or both, 
parties to adopt policy positions significantly different from the 
positions they would have adopted had they been regulating in a 
vacuum,”193 and “has important benefits in terms of developing 
quality, responsive regulation, and spreading regulatory 
innovations.”194 
 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 162. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 175. 
 193. Id. at 171. 
 194. Id. at 173. Other scholars, such as Professor Osofsky, have promoted “diagonal 
federalism” strategies that “incorporate key public and private actors at different levels of 
government (the vertical piece) and within each level of government (the horizontal piece) 
simultaneously in order to create needed crosscutting interactions.” Hari M. Osofsky, 
Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 
ALA. L. REV. 237, 241 (2011). In the disaster and land-use context “[t]here is evidence of a 
shift in governmental policy towards the vertical integration of federal, state, and local 
governmental action in order to most effectively and comprehensively address land 
development in disaster prone areas as well as a host of other economic development and 
environmental problems.” John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use Strategies, 23 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 964 (2006).  
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Discussions of multiscalar, dynamic solutions to federalism 
problems is certainly important, and the depth of analysis it provides 
helps curb oversimplification of both the need for and efficacy of 
different types of solutions to federalism-driven environmental 
concerns at different levels of government. To be clear, this Article 
fully supports, as a normative matter, jurisdictional overlap to the 
extent that it is viable under current constitutional jurisprudence. 
There is a danger, however, in allowing a focus on the very real 
benefits of dynamic federalism to detract from recognition of the 
current constitutional federalism reality. Despite the clear 
attractiveness of dynamic federalism in achieving better on-the-
ground environmental and land-use law and policy responses—the 
normative claim for how federalism often does and perhaps should 
operate—the fact remains that while it may not be preferable from an 
environmental or land-use perspective, dualism still informs 
constitutional federalism jurisprudence in some areas—this, of 
course, is the descriptive constitutional reality.195 This disconnect 
between normative and descriptive federalism analysis is evidenced by 
the debate over the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.196 
Recognizing that “dynamic federalism” exists and is beneficial, and 
that the federal and state governments should both set regulatory 
limits on any subject matter, does not make it a current 
constitutional reality, especially in light of continued judicial and 
scholarly tussling over the existence of exclusive spheres of 
governance at various levels of government.  
The interstate, commercial impacts of a variety of—if not most—
environmental and land-use-related issues are very real, and debate 
over the constitutional validity of federal legislation aimed at 
addressing those issues via the Commerce Clause should continue.197 
Yet, despite the fact that dual federalism has never accurately 
reflected the historical U.S. federalism status quo, in that the federal 
government regulates some activities that are purely local while state 
and local governments address issues of national and even global 
concern,198 neither does dynamic federalism alone accurately reflect 
 
 195. Engel, supra note 183, at 175. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See generally Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of 
Natural Capital Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375 
(2011). 
 198. Engel, supra note 183, at 167–68. Indeed, most dynamic federalism literature does 
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the current U.S. federalism status quo. There remain areas in which 
dual federalism informs both political and legal decisions for 
addressing problems long considered the sovereign realm of state 
and local authority. Some evidence of this can be seen in the 
continued debates over the scope of the Commerce Clause,199 and in 
 
not debate the Constitution at all but rather recognizes that for the most part there is 
concurrent authority between federal and state governments. As a result, most of the scholarly 
conversation is not a question of what is constitutional but what form or structure of 
governance is best. See, e.g., DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 
(Martha Derthick ed., 1999); BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE 
EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 1–37 (2004); David E. 
Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce 
Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical 
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006); Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International 
Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185 (2008); 
Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of 
Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh, When Subnational Meets 
International: The Politics and Place of Cities, States, and Provinces in the World, 102 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 339 (2008); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The 
Interaction of Science and Technology with International Law, 88 KY. L.J. 809 (2000); Kirsten 
Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local 
Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and 
Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006); David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to 
Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 53 (2003); Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 253 (2009); Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for 
Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (2007); Barry G. Rabe, North 
American Federalism and Climate Change Policy: American State and Canadian Provincial 
Policy Development, 14 WIDENER L.J. 121, 128–51 (2004); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: 
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1564 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: 
Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack 
Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2008); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global 
Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009).     
 199. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
743 (2005); Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist 
Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce 
by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 
TENN. L. REV. 605 (2001); Dan Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A Constitutional Amendment 
to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote the Environment, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 821 
(2005); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 
38 (2003); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered 
Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the 
Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735–36 (2002); Bradford C. Mank, The Murky 
Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using a Hydrological Connection Approach to 
Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 844–46 (2003); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 823, 844 (2005); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands 
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continued discussions in both scholarly literature and judicial 
decisions giving credence to the exclusive regulatory role of state and 
local governments over land use.200 Other evidence, however, is 
largely evidence by omission, in that the federal government has 
never attempted to assert direct regulatory inputs into subnational 
policies related to, for example, local zoning schemes, nonpoint 
source pollution, or private forest management—presumably because 
the federal government has viewed its hands as constitutionally tied.  
In fact, the failure of Congress to pass the National Land Use 
Policy Act (discussed below) during the most active time of federal 
environmental regulatory expansion in history, and the voluntary, 
bilateral nature of the primary federal statute aimed at influencing 
direct land-use planning, the Coastal Zone Management Act 
(CZMA), indicates that dual federalist notions remain in the area of 
land-use planning.201 If urban sprawl is such a well-recognized 
problem of national import, driven largely by state and local 
governments competing for economic growth and development with 
negative aggregate effects on the environment, why has the federal 
government not passed a statute to, for example, “establish limit 
lines and urban growth boundaries for any city in the U.S. over X 
population?” It could certainly attempt to do so while maintaining 
the benefits of dynamic federalism, in that local governments could 
maintain flexibility in designing their own land-use policies within 
that framework. Yet, the federal government has not yet attempted 
to claim such authority, almost certainly due to notions of dual 
federalism. The same might be said regarding land-use planning 
related to disaster mitigation and prevention. For example, as 
 
Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998); Sarah D. Van Loh, The Latest and Greatest 
Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty, 31 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 459 (2004); Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on 
Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321 (1997); Omar N. White, The 
Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce 
Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Just 
Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2005); Eric Brignac, Comment, The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal 
Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 883 (2001). 
 200. See supra note 16. 
 201. Indeed, though the CZMA “recognized a national interest in effective coastal 
management, Congress also recognized that the type of land-use planning and management 
required was traditionally within the domain of state and local governments.” Kristen M. 
Fletcher, Managing Coastal Development, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 147, 
152 (Donald C. Baur et al. eds., 2008). 
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discussed above in the context of nonpoint source water pollution 
from agricultural runoff, Professor Craig acknowledges that 
Congress’s operation “within constitutional federalism 
requirements” has arguably caused it to misjudge the 
constitutionality of seeking direct regulatory inputs at the federal 
level into nonpoint pollution assumed to be the sole regulatory 
purview of the state and local governments.202 Just the very fact that 
scholars and Congress continue to ruminate over whether such 
regulation would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause or 
are properly exclusive spheres of state and local governance,203 
especially given increasing evidence of the interstate commercial 
impacts of aggregated land-use policies, demonstrates that notions of 
dual federalism remain with us and affect land-use law and policy in a 
very real way. 
Until the federal government seeks direct land-use inputs via 
legislative means and such legislation is either constitutionally 
validated or denied by the courts, it is hard to discount notions of 
dualism or to assume that courts will not continue to engage in 
judicial protections of federalism by wrangling over constitutional 
provisions like the Commerce Clause. Regardless of whether 
constitutional federalism should be judicially or politically 
protected,204 or whether courts do or do not have the “ability to 
police the contours of federalism” under doctrines like the 
Commerce Clause,205 judicial protections remain in place and courts 
continue to be in “the business of distinguishing between regulatory 
 
 202. Craig, supra note 101, at 179–81. Craig notes that “[c]omprehensive federal 
regulation of nonpoint source pollution would thus arguably engage the federal government in 
land use regulation—a type of regulation historically viewed as belonging almost exclusively to 
more local levels of government” and that “because of federalism restrictions, Congress cannot 
and has not forced states to assume any regulatory burden with respect to nonpoint sources of 
water pollution. Therefore, regulation of nonpoint source polluters is left largely to states’ 
individual regulatory discretion.” Id. at 182, 186. 
 203. Craig argues that  
[a]s a matter of constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause, therefore, the 
federal government has plenary power to regulate nonpoint source pollution that 
enters waters that are navigable in fact, which traditionally includes all waters subject 
to the ebb and flow of the tide. In addition, the federal government can, under 
Lopez, regulate nonpoint source pollution that, in the aggregate, substantially affects 
interstate commerce.  
Id. at 212 (footnote omitted). 
 204. Schapiro, supra note 185, at 278–80. 
 205.  Engel, supra note 183, at 174. 
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matters that are left to the states and those that fall within Congress’s 
jurisdictional reach.”206 These judicial protections establish a 
precedent that points toward a future of continued wrangling over 
the constitutionality of federal versus subnational regulatory 
authority over certain subject matter.207 These remnants of “dual 
federalism” remain with us,208 and despite normative claims that dual 
federalism should go quietly into the night,209 it is unclear that it will 
disappear from constitutional, environmental, and, especially, land-
use-related jurisprudence any time soon.  
If we accept that dual federalism still influences environmental 
and land-use policy, we can also better understand the operation and 
full potential of dynamic federalism principles. For example, if the 
federal government does not currently maintain any recognized 
constitutional authority over certain forms of subnational land-use 
planning, then subnational governments may completely disregard 
or ignore federal targets, limits, or other goals. As a result, there will 
be no opportunity for “overlapping authority between levels of 
government,”210 and local, state, and federal roles will remain 
constitutionally mutually exclusive, thus undermining the very 
principles of dynamic federalism.  
The goal of this Part and related research211 is to introduce and 
develop a framework theory of bimodal federalism whereby scholars 
assess the current status of the constitutional institutions that 
facilitate the federal form of governance, including notions of 
dynamic federalism and remnant notions of dual federalism that 
 
 206. Id. at 183. It may be true that “such line drawing forces the Court into making 
superficial distinctions of little relevance to the issue of whether federal regulation is truly 
appropriate.” Id. at 184. Whether the federal government should be able to regulate certain 
subject matters, however, is a distinct question from current judicial interpretations of 
constitutional structure. 
 207. Id. at 174. 
 208. Id. at 175. 
 209. Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different 
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not 
as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219 (1997); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic 
Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 
(2005); Schapiro, supra note 185. 
 210. Engel, supra note 183, at 161. 
 211. The author has written a series of recent articles related to this model of federalism. 
See Hudson, supra notes 17, 181, 197 and infra note 246. See also Blake Hudson, Federal 
Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, 87 
IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012). 
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manifest legally and politically, notwithstanding normative claims 
that those manifestations should not occur. The insights derived 
from bimodal federalism analysis allow us to consider the relative 
viability and appropriateness of legislative responses based upon any 
currently recognized institutional constraints at any level of 
governance. Bimodal federalism theory should encapsulate a 
snapshot of U.S. federalism at a point in time, taking into account 
current practical applications of past federalism theory (dual 
federalism)212 and assessing them within the same framework as 
current applications of new theories of federalism (dynamic 
federalism).213 Doing so provides not only a clearer conception of the 
current state of constitutional affairs regarding federal, state, or local 
regulatory authority over certain subject matter, but also the most 
effective methods of overcoming potential federalism-driven 
regulatory roadblocks.  
This Article accepts the normative claim that there should be as 
much overlap as possible in jurisdictional regulatory authority to 
capture the benefits of dynamic federalism, and to the extent one 
level of government is not tackling an important issue, other levels of 
government should be able to fill the void. Thus, federal, state, and 
local governments should share regulatory responsibilities, and none 
should be arbitrarily precluded or preempted from addressing any 
regulatory target.214 Arbitrary preclusion, however, is different from 
preclusion based upon the reality of current constitutional 
jurisprudence. As such, bimodal federalism acknowledges that there 
may be judicially and politically driven dualistic notions regarding 
certain regulatory targets that must be taken into account when 
crafting regulatory responses, notwithstanding increased recognition 
of, and normative claims for, a movement towards governance via 
dynamic federalism. To the extent that remnant dualist notions 
remain and restrain the operation of dynamic federalism, this Article 
seeks to develop an understanding of what types of legislative 
mechanisms most readily provide viable policy responses, including 
an assessment of the constitutional viability of those responses. In 
other words, what legislative mechanisms across levels of governance 
 
 212. Engel, supra note 183, at 175. 
 213. See generally id. 
 214. As Professor Engel has noted, there is “danger [in] charging any one level of 
government with environmental protection and closing the door to the policy-making efforts 
of other levels of government.” Id. at 181. 
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are not only normatively desirable, given dynamic federalism, but are 
also constitutionally permissible in areas where dualistic notions 
remain, such as the area of land-use planning? This constitutional 
analysis serves as a reference point for legislators seeking to 
implement effective solutions without constitutional complication 
and for courts adjudicating conflicts over allocation of regulatory 
authority.  
To this end, it becomes necessary to independently assess the 
well-recognized concepts215 of “top-down,” “bilateral,” and 
“horizontal” legislative responses to addressing federalism issues. It is 
necessary to utilize these concepts because in an area where dualist 
remnants remain, such as exclusive subnational regulatory authority 
over general land-use planning, there may currently be no 
constitutionally viable top-down federal approach available. As a 
result, bilateral and horizontal approaches are the only mechanisms 
that may overlap in a dynamic way. Thus, given the reality of the 
dynamic/dualist nature of U.S. federalism, it is important to 
consider the actual legislative mechanisms facilitating regulatory 
solutions across levels of government. This is especially so 
considering that dynamic federalism principles may be stifled in the 
presence of constitutional roadblocks at any one level of governance.  
The usage of these terms, however, is not intended to refer back 
to strict dual-federalism theory, which analyzed these mechanisms as 
mutually exclusive means of facilitating governance in federal 
systems. Rather, consistent with dynamic-federalism theory, these 
mechanisms may be operating simultaneously at all levels of 
governance.216 Indeed, as dynamic federalism scholars have 
 
 215. See Osofsky, supra note 194, at 276, 278–80; see also Craig Anthony Arnold, The 
Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
441 (2007); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 108 (2005); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49–56 (2003); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and 
Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 570 (1996); Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water 
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006).  
 216.  Indeed, the extensive scholarly literature cited in supra notes 198 and 215 is often 
grouped under the heading of dynamic federalism and explores these different types of 
relationships. This Article lays out the three fundamental modalities most often discussed, each 
of which could be pieces of a dynamic approach, but which also must take into account 
remnants of dual federalism currently being debated in both the scholarly literature and the 
judiciary. 
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highlighted, “overlapping jurisdiction may be pivotal to encouraging 
the more appropriate level of government to respond to a given 
problem.”217 As a result, the analysis below is not intended to neatly 
affix one particular mechanism as the only appropriate solution to 
one particular category of disaster. The “coupling” in the analysis 
below seeks to associate one particular mechanism with one or more 
categories of disaster only for the purposes of, first, assessing the 
potential constitutionality of federal top-down mechanisms for 
different categories of disaster, and, second, making a normative 
claim that some disasters may call for more significant federal inputs 
into subnational land-use policy which some mechanisms might 
more readily facilitate than others. Thus, it is the balance of federal 
and subnational inputs with which this Article is concerned—a 
balance that may call for greater federal inputs in circumstances 
where subnational governments fail to act. For example, in the 
absence of subnational action to adjust land-use policies related to 
perpetual disasters, the scale of such disasters and the national 
interest that they implicate may call for the more consistent and 
holistic standards facilitated by a top-down approach. At the same 
time, bilateral and horizontal mechanisms may certainly overlap, 
supplement, or even exceed any minimum top-down standards that 
exist, consistent with dynamic federalism. Indeed, this Part echoes 
disaster scholar Charles Perrow’s call for “[f]ederal and state 
governments [to] establish minimum standards, which states or 
localities can exceed”218—in other words, to establish floors rather 
than ceilings of environmental and land-use standards.219 Or perhaps 
the federal government could establish mandatory guidelines for 
setting standards, but allow states and localities the flexibility to 
tailor such standards in a way that not only facilitates the benefits of 
decentralized governance but that also achieves effective land-use-
related disaster mitigation and prevention goals for all categories of 
disaster. 
B. Top-Down 
The first mechanism for reconstituting land-use federalism in the 
context of disaster mitigation and prevention is a top-down approach 
 
 217. Engel, supra note 183, at 177. 
 218. PERROW, supra note 140, at 36. 
 219. Engel, supra note 183, at 185. 
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whereby the U.S. federal government attempts to use currently 
available constitutional mechanisms to gain legal inputs into 
subnational land-use policy. This would require either a direct 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution granting the federal 
government constitutional authority or it would necessitate 
expanded judicial interpretation of current constitutional provisions 
that might grant the federal government such authority.  
1. Constitutional amendment 
Various scholars have discussed both the need for and the 
efficacy of amending the U.S. Constitution either to provide citizens 
a fundamental constitutional right to environmental protection or to 
allow the federal government to constitutionally regulate the 
environment via mechanisms that it may not currently employ.220 
Though a constitutional amendment allowing greater federal inputs 
into land-use policies aimed at avoiding or mitigating environmental 
disaster is certainly a possibility, this mechanism for reconstituting 
federalism is perhaps the least likely to occur.  
There have been over ten thousand proposed amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution,221 and of course only a few have passed—no 
doubt due to the difficulties of pushing an amendment through the 
Article V process.222 Professor J.B. Ruhl has provided a framework 
for assessing the efficacy and desirability of amending the U.S. 
Constitution with an “environmental quality amendment” (EQA), 
noting that calls for such an amendment have been on the rise in 
 
 220. See Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy 
Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013 (2004); Gildor, supra note 199; J.B. Ruhl, The 
Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments 
Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (1999); Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting 
Biodiversity for Future Generations: An Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 8 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 181 (1994); Pamela B. Schmaltz, Comment, Is It Time for an Environmental 
Amendment?, 38 LOY. L. REV. 451, 461–62 (1992). 
 221. RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE 
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 169 (1993). See also 
JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–2002 at 540–58 (2003) (collating most 
popular proposals by year); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On Amending the Constitution: A Plea for 
Patience, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 677, 681–93 (1989–90) (discussing the successful 
passage of various amendments). 
 222. A constitutional amendment must be proposed by either two-thirds of both houses 
or two-thirds of state governments and ratified by three-quarters of state governments. U.S. 
CONST. art. V. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 2:51 PM 
1991 Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism 
 2041 
recent decades.223 EQAs tend to be very general and aspirational, as 
Ruhl describes, including language such as, “[t]he natural resources 
of the nation are the heritage of present and future generations. The 
right of each person to clean and healthful air and water, and to the 
protection of other natural resources of the nation, shall not be 
infringed by any person.”224  
Ruhl developed a matrix to assess the viability of proposed 
amendments along two axes: a function axis and a target axis.225   
The function axis describes the institutional role that the amendment 
is to serve, such as whether it (1) alters the operational rules of 
government, (2) prohibits specified government action, (3) creates 
or affirms individual rights, or (4) expresses aspirational goals.226 The 
target axis describes the societal interaction that is adjusted by the 
functional change, such as (1) intra- and intergovernmental relations, 
(2) relations between a government and its citizens, or (3) relations 
between citizens.227 Ruhl notes that EQAs tend to fall into a 
category that no existing amendment to the Constitution does—that 
of an amendment establishing aspirational goals (function 4) for 
citizen-citizen relations (target 3). Ruhl believes the Constitution is 
no place for these types of aspirational dictates,228 largely because 
such a mandate must necessarily be drafted either ambiguously or so 
narrowly as to make implementation exceedingly difficult.  
An amendment that would allow U.S. federal government inputs 
into land-use decisions related to disaster mitigation and prevention, 
however, would fall into a category far more likely to be efficacious 
according to Ruhl’s matrix—if, that is, such an amendment could 
first be passed. Such an amendment might simply declare: “The 
federal government of the United States maintains the authority to 
establish regulatory standards for land-use-related disaster mitigation 
and prevention.” This amendment would have the function of 
altering the operational rules of government (function 1) in order to 
 
 223. Ruhl, supra note 220, at 247, 248–49. 
 224. Id. at 248. 
 225. Id. at 253. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. 
 228. Ruhl states that “any EQA attempting to capture a normative statement about the 
environment and plug it into the United States Constitution is simply a bad idea,” id. at 252, 
and that “amendments purporting to express aspirational values or regulate civil relations, or 
do both, should set off bells and whistles in the political evaluation process.” Id. at 260.  
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adjust the target of intergovernmental relations (target 1).229 Indeed, 
nine amendments currently fall under this category of the matrix.230 
If U.S. federal and subnational governments one day agreed to 
change the operational rules of government and the current status of 
intergovernmental relations by allowing more direct federal inputs 
into land-use planning via a constitutional amendment, the 
amendment would fall into the category described by Ruhl as far 
more likely to be viable in achieving results than aspirational, citizen-
citizen relation amendments. Furthermore, though the legislative 
process is preferable to constitutional amendment a vast majority of 
the time, lest the constitution become diluted and take the form of a 
legislative instrument, society may be unable to achieve some policies 
in the absence of an amendment.231 Ruhl argues that 
[t]he question of need, therefore, is whether there is any 
institutional barrier to fulfilling the fundamental, widely accepted 
social policy through routine legislative and judicial forums. . . . 
[S]ome amendments have forced an intransigent minority of states 
to come into line with the rest of the nation on fundamental social 
policy issues associated with matters traditionally (or 
constitutionally) left to state jurisdiction. Where federal legislation 
cannot impose the policy over state resistance and the courts 
cannot mold the existing constitutional text to handle the stubborn 
states, an amendment is the only alternative. These are examples of 
institutional necessity, where an amendment, and only an 
amendment, can allow the widely accepted social policy to move 
forward in society.232  
There is arguably an institutional barrier to certain federal regulatory 
inputs into local land-use policies—a barrier in the form of current 
understandings of U.S. constitutional law. Furthermore, the dearth 
of responsible state and local government land-use planning related 
to disaster mitigation and prevention demonstrates that an 
amendment allowing greater federal inputs into subnational land-use 
 
 229. It would not be prohibitory (target 2) because it would allow the states to also set 
land-use standards related to disaster prevention and mitigation, consistent with principles of 
dynamic federalism. It also would not create or affirm any rights in either private parties or 
governmental entities (target 3), and it is clearly not aspirational (target 4), as is an EQA. 
 230. Ruhl, supra note 220, at 261.  
 231. Id. at 270–71. 
 232. Id. at 271 (footnotes omitted). 
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policy could be a last resort to overcoming that barrier with the most 
effective social policy. 
Other scholars have similarly argued for constitutional 
amendments to rebalance the relationship between the U.S. federal 
government and the states, which would allow greater federal inputs 
into environmental policy making when the states refuse to act.233 
This type of amendment would be a “purely structural 
amendment,”234 rather than a substantive amendment providing a 
right to a clean and healthy environment, and it would merely 
“empower[] Congress to legislate regarding the environment”235 if 
Congress chose to do so. In other words, nothing would compel the 
federal government to act, nor would any new fundamental 
constitutional rights be created in the citizenry. 
The likelihood of an amendment being efficacious, however, is a 
different question from whether such an amendment is likely to be 
passed. The U.S. Congress has never attempted to harness current 
constitutional powers to directly address subnational land-use policy, 
much less placed a constitutional amendment on its agenda. So even 
though this type of structural amendment may be of the kind most 
likely to be workable if enacted, and remains an option worthy of 
future study, it remains perhaps the least viable mechanism for 
reconstituting federalism to address transitory and perpetual 
disasters—especially given the difficulty of convincing three-quarters 
of the states to ratify an amendment that intrudes on state regulatory 
powers, and given that any kind of “constitutional environmental 
amendment is unlikely in the current political climate.”236 An 
amendment, however, is not the only top-down mechanism available 
to the United States, as current constitutional provisions may 
provide the federal government authority over subnational disaster-
related land-use policy that it has not yet claimed or that has not yet 
been validated by courts interpreting the Constitution. 
2. Constitutional interpretation 
A more viable mechanism for top-down reconstitution of 
federalism for certain types of disaster mitigation and prevention is 
 
 233. Craig, supra note 220, at 11018–20. 
 234. Id. at 11020. 
 235. Gildor, supra note 199, at 823. 
 236. Craig, supra note 220, at 11018. 
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expanded understanding of current constitutional provisions. In the 
United States, the Commerce Clause is the primary constitutional 
provision under which most environmental legislation is passed.237 
Congress could certainly pass a “Land Use Disaster Mitigation and 
Prevention Act” that would test the waters of judicial interpretation 
regarding the scope of Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause. Of course, the purpose of the transitory/perpetual spectrum 
is to demonstrate for which types of disasters it might be more 
constitutionally viable for the federal government to gain direct 
regulatory inputs. Therefore, if such a statute sought to limit or set 
other land-use policies and rules for the development of floodplains 
in the Mississippi River Valley, due to the frequent and 
interjurisdictional (interstate) economic damages resulting from 
major flood events, then under Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
such an act might be more likely to be found constitutional. The 
same holds true for potential federal regulation of nonpoint source 
agricultural pollution that empties from the Mississippi River Valley 
and leads to eutrophication of the Gulf, negatively impacting 
fisheries, and for land-use policies that exacerbate the spread of 
invasive species that have devastating economic impacts across state 
jurisdictions—like the cogongrass that plagues the forest industry.  
These types of disasters, though related to private land-use 
regulation that has historically been the constitutional purview of 
state and local governments, may very well be reached under the 
“substantial effects” test for determining the constitutionality of 
federal action under the Commerce Clause.238 Numerous federal 
statutes regulating natural resources have been upheld under this 
test,239 including the Endangered Species Act, which was upheld 
even for the regulation of wholly intrastate species with arguably 
 
 237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 238. Congress can regulate three kinds of activities under the Commerce Clause: (1) the 
channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) 
“those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 
(1995) (citations omitted). 
 239. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (marijuana); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter 
of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (endangered species); United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (wetlands); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 
314 (1981) (minerals); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 
(1981) (minerals); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (endangered species); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (wheat). 
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tenuous connections to interstate commerce.240 How much more so, 
then, might land-use policies that implicate agricultural, commercial, 
and industrial impacts on navigable waterways (floodplains and water 
bodies affected by nonpoint runoff); that implicate commercial and 
other development in the coastal zone (impacted by hurricanes, 
floods, and sea-level rise); and that exacerbate interjurisdictional 
impacts and federal disaster relief expenditures, be found to 
substantially affect interstate commerce? Unlike endangered species, 
after all, agricultural and fisheries products are commodities that are 
exchanged on the open market. The development of floodplains and 
the coastal zone also implicates commercial activity with direct ties to 
a resource over which the federal government has already been found 
to have constitutional authority—“navigable waters” as that term is 
interpreted under the Clean Water Act.  
Recent research establishes a unified theory for assessing the 
validity of Congressional authority to regulate the environment, 
doing so through the lens of commons analysis.241 This analysis 
demonstrates that the federal government has traditionally 
maintained constitutional authority to regulate two categories of 
environmental resources as substantially affecting interstate 
commerce: (1) natural resources contained on land (wetlands, 
endangered species, or other natural capital) that are appropriated by 
economic development (retail, housing, industrial, agricultural, etc.), 
and (2) resources appropriated by individuals and tied to an 
interstate market (wheat, marijuana, or other natural capital 
commodities). Floodplains appropriated by economic development, 
the spread of invasive species exacerbated by industrial operations 
(and thus appropriating native flora and fauna), and clean Mississippi 
River and Gulf water appropriated by agricultural and industrial 
pollution all arguably fall under these tests. Anytime these 
mechanisms of economic development replace the wetlands of 
floodplains, native flora and fauna, or clean interjurisdictional waters, 
there is an appropriator of the resource (such as a developer or an 
industrial operator) and a resource that is being appropriated (such 
as floodplain wetlands, native flora and fauna, or clean water). These 
are the constituent components of a commons, and it is this act of 
 
 240. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting). 
 241. Hudson, supra note 197. 
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“appropriation” that substantially affects interstate commerce and 
that gives the federal government constitutional authority over 
resource management.242 
Disaster law scholars have questioned whether the Commerce 
Clause might be harnessed to allow more direct involvement by the 
federal government in land-use-related disaster mitigation and 
prevention, asking, for example, “[w]hat if Congress decided, in 
advance of a disaster, to mitigate disaster risk by regulating local land 
use? Would it have Commerce Clause authority, for instance, to 
create federal zoning laws prohibiting building within 100 feet of an 
earthquake fault?”243 Other disaster scholars have directly advocated 
for greater top-down inputs from the federal government, asserting, 
We need a more centralized regulatory system. Local initiative is 
simply not reliable in the case of mitigation. Localities are reluctant 
to enforce state standards, national standards are few, and 
enforcement is lax. This is an area where centralized regulation—
standards and enforcement—is needed; given the political influence 
of growth-oriented city officials and property and building 
interests, there is bound to be a “failure” of the private market.244 
In the specific context of flooding and sea-level rise, the 
Association of State Floodplain Managers have similarly argued for 
more top-down inputs, incorporating elements of dynamic 
federalism, asserting that, 
A nationwide vision and policy for water resources sustainability 
and flood loss reduction are essential. This would require 
legislation incorporating both a national floodplain management 
policy and a national riparian and coastal areas policy. The act 
should establish unequivocally both the value to the nation of these 
resource areas and their natural functions, as well as their inherent 
hazards. This policy needs to be supported with a comprehensive 
legislative package to be coordinated with and implemented 
through states, local governments, tribes, governors, and 
others. . . . A high-level, central point of coordination and 
implementation is needed to ensure that water-related laws and 
programs at all levels are seamlessly aligned and integrated. This 
could be a new federal agency or other entity . . . . We must 
consider carefully the central question of whether a national policy 
 
 242. See id. at 423–27. 
 243. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 79. 
 244. PERROW, supra note 140, at 37. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 2:51 PM 
1991 Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism 
 2047 
of water resources “development” is still relevant for 2050 and 
beyond or whether a policy of water resources “sustainability” that 
balances human and ecosystem needs is a wiser approach.245 
Ultimately, if the federal government seeks regulatory inputs into 
what the spectrum categorizes as perpetual or “gray area” disasters, 
there are strong arguments that it may do so pursuant to its 
Commerce Clause authority. Not only do perpetual and “gray area” 
disasters more clearly impact interstate commerce, but they also 
result in greater federal expenditures in disaster relief due to their 
scale—thus implicating greater national interest. Furthermore, due 
to the great scale of these disasters, the federal government has more 
governance capacity to both set federal minimum standards and 
enforce regulatory authority than do the many disparate state and 
local governments along the Mississippi watershed or across 
jurisdictions plagued by invasive species. The corollary, however, is 
that a top-down mechanism for addressing transitory disasters is far 
less likely to be constitutionally viable. Land-use policies that 
exacerbate localized flooding, fires, and urban heat waves are more 
likely to have impacts limited to a local area, where state and local 
governments would have more governance capacity and information 
to craft and enforce standards. In addition, the case for their 
substantial effects on interstate commerce would arguably be harder 
to make.  
To be clear, a top-down mechanism is not without complication. 
While perpetual disasters may be more readily considered to have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce than, say, endangered 
species protection, they also fall more squarely within the category of 
a direct land-use activity traditionally regulated by state and local 
governments, such as zoning of commercial and residential 
structures. This is because regulation of endangered species may only 
indirectly impact land-use activities otherwise subject to state 
regulatory authority.246 This makes passage of such legislation more 
difficult as a political matter, especially given the current political 
climate.247 The federal government may perceive that it is just as 
 
 245. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 41, at 35. 
 246. See Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests, and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the 
Trees, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363, 388–94 (2011). 
 247. The 2009 midterm congressional elections resulted in the largest shift in power in 
the House of Representatives since 1948 and ushered in representatives opposed to not only 
climate cap and trade, but also a wide swath of environmental regulatory policies. Quinn 
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limited in enacting limits on floodplain development, nonpoint 
source water pollution, or invasive species as it would be setting 
growth boundaries around major U.S. cities, a zoning-driven 
mechanism of land-use regulation currently the responsibility of the 
states. Therefore, legal perception becomes political reality, as the 
government politically acts as if its hands are tied due to perceived 
legal constraints. In addition, an act granting top-down land-use 
planning authority, even if passed, would be subject to other legal 
protections afforded to private property owners, such as the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause. Even so, it certainly seems that 
regulation requiring minimum standards for land-use planning in 
these types of disaster prone areas could be crafted to avoid such 
constitutional complications and could further be structured to 
maintain the benefits provided by decentralized land-use policy. 
Ultimately, though the constitutionality of federal subnational land-
use legislation has yet to be tested by the U.S. Congress and within 
U.S. courts, there are good arguments supporting its legitimacy and 
expanded constitutional interpretation may be a viable top-down 
mechanism for addressing perpetual and “gray area” disasters.248  
A top-down approach, however, for reconstituting federalism to 
mitigate and prevent land-use-related disasters is not a necessary or 
inevitably preferable mechanism. While top-down inputs can 
certainly be crafted in a way that preserves decentralized land-use 
governance and the role of subnational governments in crafting 
either their own policies or policies supplemental to federal policy, 
top-down approaches are not without hazard. Improperly crafted 
top-down prescriptive regulation “often leads to an increasing spiral 
of tightening regulations, which progressively jeopardise the 
viability” of decentralized governance.249 As such, bilateral and 
horizontal approaches should also be considered. 
 
Bowman & Chris Amico, Congress Loses Hundreds of Years of Experience—But Majority of 
Incumbents Stick Around, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 5, 2010, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/11/congress-loses-hundreds-of-years-of-
experience---but-vast-majority-of-incumbents-stick-around.html; Renee Schoof, With GOP in 
Charge of House, Environmental Policy Will Shift, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://tinyurl.com/7fn2t3y; The Most Anti-Environment House in History, COMM. ON 
ENERGY & COMMERCE DEMOCRATS, http://tinyurl.com/5ta3g93 (last visited Oct. 14, 
2011). 
 248. See generally Hudson, supra note 197. 
 249. Graham R. Wilkinson, Forest Practices Bd., Codes of Forest Practice as Regulatory 
Tools for Sustainable Forest Management 3, paper presented to the 18th Biennial Conference 
of the Institute of Foresters of Australia (Oct. 3–8, 1999) (citation omitted) (“In contrast, a 
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C. Bilateral 
A bilateral approach to reconstituting federalism involves the 
federal government incentivizing subnational governments to take 
action on land-use planning aimed at mitigating or preventing 
disasters, which can be accomplished in two basic ways. The first is a 
cooperative federalism approach whereby the federal government 
passes an act establishing minimum disaster-related land-use 
planning standards to which subnational governments can 
voluntarily bind themselves, while at the same time receiving 
“carrots” in the form of financial payments or authority to dictate 
policy over matters that might otherwise be the purview of the 
federal government. The second approach is one of “uncooperative 
federalism,” whereby the federal government might use other 
constitutional “sticks” at its disposal, such as wielding the spending 
power and refusing to fund projects within subnational jurisdictions 
or refusing to provide some other entitlement subnational 
governments normally receive. Under either approach, the federal 
government “encourages” the states to develop minimum land-use 
planning standards. Indeed, scholars have noted that in other land-
use contexts, such as urban sprawl, “the complex institutional terrain 
affecting [land use] requires substantial reliance on outright 
acquisition of important green spaces as well as reliance on 
regulatory strategies that entice participants, rather than prescribe a 
particular urban form or seek to punish or coerce regulatory 
targets.”250 Unlike the top-down approaches discussed in the 
previous section, which are likely more constitutionally viable for 
perpetual or “gray area” disasters than for transitory ones, a bilateral 
mechanism may be utilized effectively and without constitutional 
constraint for all disaster categories along the spectrum. 
 
self-regulatory approach can avoid unnecessary bureaucratic costs and provide greater flexibility 
and autonomy for industry, in return for improved environmental performance.”).  
 250. Buzbee, supra note 96, at 61. Indeed, one suggested approach for floodplain 
management is federal purchase of properties at risk for flooding. The severe Midwest floods of 
1993 resulted in the federal government buying 25,000 flooded residential properties at a cost 
of $1 billion in a “voluntary buyout program designed to return floodplains to their natural 
state.” FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 34. 
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1. Cooperative federalism 
Under a cooperative federalism approach, the federal 
government could pass a “Land Use Disaster Mitigation and 
Prevention Act” (LUDMPA) that sets minimum land-use planning 
standards for disaster mitigation and prevention. The states would 
develop their own land-use plans consistent with federal standards, 
perhaps through the modification of their enabling acts, and would 
voluntarily opt into the program based upon a variety of financial, 
political, and legal incentives. Pursuant to dynamic federalism 
principles, the state governments in turn could allow for local 
government flexibility in setting those standards based upon local 
needs and constraints, and would be allowed to set standards more 
rigorous than or supplemental to federal standards. Subnational 
governments would receive funds to implement the program, and 
might also gain a degree of authority over not only federal actions, 
but also the actions of adjacent subnational governments, to ensure 
that those actions are consistent with the state plan. As discussed 
further below, subnational governments refusing to opt into the act 
might be induced to do so based upon a variety of disincentives, 
such as the withdrawal of federal funds for projects within the 
jurisdiction if they do not opt in within a certain time frame. 
The LUDMPA could operate like a combination of the proposed 
National Land Use Policy Act (NLUPA), which the U.S. Senate 
passed twice in the early 1970s, but which was never enacted,251 and 
the more narrow but ultimately (and relatively) successful CZMA.252 
The purpose of the NLUPA was  
to establish a national policy to encourage and assist the several 
States to more effectively exercise their constitutional 
responsibilities for the planning, management, and administration 
of the Nation’s land resources through the development and 
implementation of comprehensive “Statewide Environmental, 
Recreational and Industrial Land Use Plans” . . . and management 
programs designed to achieve an ecologically and environmentally 
sound use of the Nation’s land resources.253  
 
 251. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, The National Land Use Policy Act, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 519, 520–21 (1996). 
 252. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006). 
 253. S. 3354, 91st Cong., 116 CONG. REC. S1760, S1761 (Jan. 29, 1970). 
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NLUPA would have provided funding to states to develop their own 
land-use management plans in accordance with federal standards as 
well as a robust provision of data to assist the states in developing 
such plans.254 Furthermore, the NLUPA would have established a 
federal agency whose role would have been to coordinate and ensure 
other federal agency compliance with state plans.255 State plans, in 
turn, were to designate areas of conservation and areas of 
development,256 and states with approved plans would have been 
required to set management standards for five categories of land use 
of “more than local concern”257: 
(1) all development in areas of “critical environmental concern”; 
e.g., beaches, wetlands, important wildlife habitats, and historic 
sites; 
(2) key facilities, such as major airports, highway interchanges, and 
recreational facilities; 
(3) large scale developments, such as industrial parks, shopping 
centers, and major subdivisions; 
(4) regional public or private facilities, such as solid waste disposal 
or sewerage systems that significantly affect surrounding land uses; 
and 
(5) major recreational or second-home development of rural 
land.258 
The NLUPA would have “established a clear role for each level 
of government and insured that their activities would be 
coordinated.”259 Perhaps more importantly, “[i]t would have 
integrated local, state and federal systems.”260 Some have argued that 
“had such a law been adopted before the complex structure of 
environmental law was cobbled together, the cost, complexity and 
confusion of the current system could have been lessened.”261 The 
 
 254. 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3:2 (5th ed. 2011). 
 255. Id.  
 256. John R. Nolon, Fusing Economic and Environmental Policy: The Need for Framework 
Laws in the United States and Argentina, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 685, 719 (1996). 
 257. John H. Davidson, Ecosystem Management in the Smaller Watershed, 2 GREAT 
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 68, 76 (1997). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Nolon, supra note 256, at 724. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 718. 
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voluntary approach, which promoted incentives to cooperate over 
adherence to rigid standards,262 was intended to “lessen the ‘needless 
and costly conflicts between agencies and departments of the Federal 
Governments, between State and Federal Government, and between 
State and local government.’”263 In other words, this approach has 
the potential to alleviate the problems created by an overly zealous 
top-down approach. Of course, the flip-side is that it might also have 
less “bite” in achieving results on the ground because there is no 
legally coercive foundation for ensuring the standards are put into 
place.  
Though the NLUPA was not passed, the United States has 
already experimented with a bilateral approach in the land-use 
context with CZMA, which was passed to gain greater state 
involvement in the protection of the coastal zone and was based 
upon a variety of federal standards.264 Many had hoped the CZMA 
would be part of a larger land-use management act, such as the 
NLUPA,265 but the CZMA was “successful” where the NLUPA 
failed in part “due to the fact that it both aided development while 
preserving the environment.”266  
The CZMA program is completely voluntary, but the federal 
government provides incentives to induce states to opt in.267 The first 
incentive is simply funding the program’s implementation, which is 
to be used to  
preserve or restore specific areas in the state because of their 
conservation, recreational, ecological, or aesthetic values, or contain 
one or more resources of national significance; to redevelop . . . 
deteriorating or underutilized urban waterfronts or ports; to 
provide public access to public beaches, coastal waters and areas of 
recreational, historical, aesthetic, ecological or cultural significance; 
 
 262. Id. at 724. 
 263. Id. at 724–25 (citing Senator Henry Jackson introducing Senate Bill 3354, National 
Land Use Policy Act of 1970, 116 CONG. REC. S1757, S1759 (Jan. 29, 1970)). 
 264. SALKIN, supra note 254, § 3:3. 
 265. Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s 
in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 751 
(1996). 
 266. SALKIN, supra note 264, §3.3.  
 267. Id. 
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or to develop a coordinated process for regulating permits for 
aquaculture facilities.268  
The second incentive is perhaps more enticing from a state 
government point of view. The state effectively gains authority over 
the actions of both the federal government and other state 
governments that it would not otherwise have.269 After the federal 
government has approved a state plan, the federal government 
cannot undertake any action or even issue any permits for others to 
take action within the state’s coastal zone unless those actions are 
found by the state to be “consistent” with the state’s plan.270 So, for 
example, the U.S. Coast Guard may want to build a new facility 
within a state’s coastal zone. Though the agency previously had the 
authority to do so at its discretion, it now must obtain confirmation 
from the state in which the facility is to be located that siting of the 
facility will be consistent with the state’s CZMA implementation 
plan. The same holds true for the actions of adjacent states in the 
coastal zone—there is a reciprocal responsibility for adjacent states to 
act, or authorize other parties to act, consistent with their neighbors’ 
plans.271 At present, thirty-four U.S. states and territories maintain 
agencies approved by the federal government to implement the 
CZMA.272  
Though the NLUPA was never enacted, and the CZMA has 
been criticized as inconsistent273 and may not have the “bite” that it 
perhaps could have, these examples of bilateral approaches to 
reconstituting the balance of federal and subnational roles in land-
use policy provide models for how a similar act might be structured 
for disaster-related land-use planning. Furthermore, the great degree 
of flexibility that a bilateral mechanism facilitates would be equally 
viable, if structured properly, for addressing perpetual, transitory, or 
“gray area” disasters, either supplemental to, or in lieu of, top-down 
or horizontal approaches. Therefore, a bilateral approach could be 
coupled with, or supplemental to, top-down or horizontal 
 
 268. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 269. See id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id.  
 273. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 81 
(1997). 
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approaches related to the same or other categories of disaster 
consistent with principles of dynamic federalism. 
2. Uncooperative federalism 
Uncooperative federalism is the “mostly stick” end of the 
bilateral spectrum, with the federal government not providing 
“carrots” in the form of positive incentives for cooperation, but 
rather disincentives through the threat of withholding federal funds 
from states.274 The federal government may withhold federal 
highway funds, for instance, as it has successfully done in other 
contexts.275 Or the federal government could withhold funds that it 
normally funnels to the states to implement other federal statutes for 
which the federal government maintains constitutional authority, 
such as the Clean Water Act in the United States. Professor Buzbee 
has noted that 
  
[o]ne of the most promising and traditional methods for the 
federal government to encourage state or local actions consistent 
with a federal goal is to provide conditional federal funding for 
certain state or local activities. Given the substantial undercutting 
by the Supreme Court of other federal strategies to enlist states in 
furthering federally defined ends, conditional federal spending has 
become a particularly significant regulatory strategy.276  
 
 
 274. This usage of the phrase “uncooperative federalism” is only meant as a descriptor 
and is not to be confused with any particular theory of federalism. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-
Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1263 (2009) 
(providing a theory of uncooperative federalism that takes “a fully developed account of the 
ways in which states playing the role of federal servant can also resist federal mandates”). 
 275. E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 276. Buzbee, supra note 96, at 107. Professor Nolon has argued that the Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA) provides a model of federal, state, and local interaction that 
“could be a blueprint for an integrated federalist approach to a host of land use and 
environmental problems.” Nolon, supra note 194, at 965. The DMA relies in part on 
uncooperative federalism approaches, requiring that subnational governments develop 
mitigation plans that identify hazard risks in their jurisdictions in order to qualify for federal 
hazard mitigation grants. Id. Even so, “there is little emphasis in [the regulations] on the use 
of effective local land-use strategies to create disaster resilient, or adaptive, communities.” Id. 
at 967. This does not mean, however, that some states and local communities are not 
influenced by the DMA to engage in more robust land-use planning in disaster prone areas. 
E.g., CITY OF BOULDER, COLO., BOULDER VALLEY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (2008), available 
at http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/files/PDS/BVCP/bvcp.pdf; Growth Management Act, 
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008). 
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Further highlighting the potential benefits of a bilateral 
approach, Professor Buzbee states that “monetary enticements to 
encourage participation in [land-use] initiatives are likely the most 
effective device to surmount complex institutional frameworks where 
no unitary entity with coercive authority exists and where different 
local needs may lead to different levels of interest in such 
programmatic goals.”277  
At a minimum, the federal government could withhold 
expenditures for programs that exacerbate land-use-related disasters. 
Indeed, experts argue that a clear way to mitigate and prevent 
flooding in local communities is to restrict federal expenditures that 
could “foster development or infrastructure in high-risk and/or 
environmentally sensitive areas.”278 These experts argue that federal 
programs that fund and subsidize development or redevelopment in 
flood-prone areas—including disaster relief—“unwittingly provide 
for making unwise decisions and taking inappropriate action with 
regard to our water resources.”279 This is the approach of the Coastal 
Barrier Resources Reauthorization Act of 2000 (CBRA),280 another 
example of a current bilateral mechanism aimed at flooding and 
damage in coastal areas. The CBRA designates undeveloped coastal 
barrier islands for inclusion in the Coastal Barrier Resource 
System.281 Once designated, the Act denies federal funds for new 
construction on those islands,282 and “specifically denies direct 
federal grants for infrastructure improvements, coastal protection 
projects, and [flood] insurance for any new construction.”283 The 
program has had limited success, however, and “[t]he continued 
development of coastal barrier islands highlights the conclusion that 
merely denying federal subsidies to coastal floodplains would not 
prevent their development. Rather . . . property owners may find it 
 
 277. Buzbee, supra note 96, at 117. 
 278. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 41, at 33. 
 279. Id. at 34. Furthermore, a variety of federal agency programs, such as the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Economic Development 
Administration have subsidized and promoted development in floodplains. FARBER ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 32–33.  
 280. Coastal Barrier Resources Reauthorization Act of 2000, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3510 
(2006). 
 281. Id. §§ 3502–3503. 
 282. Id. § 3504. 
 283. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 339–40. 
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profitable to incur occasional flood damages in exchange for the high 
rental returns possible from desirable beachfront properties.”284 
In reality, to be effective, an uncooperative federalism 
arrangement would most likely need to be tied to a cooperative 
bilateral statute. Interestingly, though the NLUPA would have been 
a voluntary program, it was not without teeth in the sense that it 
blended cooperative and uncooperative federalism approaches. For 
example, under the NLUPA, if a state failed to adopt a land-use plan 
within four years after the act was passed then the state would stop 
receiving funding for other federal programs, such as highway 
construction or other public works, which would be reduced by 20 
percent a year until the state developed a land-use plan in comport 
with NLUPA standards.285 Later amendments to the bill actually 
strengthened sanctions, providing that if a state did not submit a 
statewide plan within five years, then “no federal agency was 
permitted to undertake any new action or financially support any 
state action that may have a substantially adverse environmental 
impact.”286 Such a provision would, for example, grind commercial 
development in wetland areas to a halt if states did not pass a state 
plan, as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers must permit the filling of 
wetlands connected to “navigable waters” for development. 
Ultimately, an uncooperative federalism approach might be a 
viable tool for reconstituting federalism related to land-use-related 
disaster mitigation and prevention, especially when coupled with a 
cooperative federalism statute. Given that the U.S. Congress 
seriously considered such an approach in the land-use context with 
NLUPA and has succeeded in a “soft” approach with the CZMA in 
the environmental and land-use context without state resistance—
and indeed with broad state participation—a bilateral statute aimed 
at subnational land-use-related disaster policy, if properly crafted, 
might be a successful mechanism for rebalancing federal-state roles in 
disaster mitigation and prevention. This is especially so if a top-
down, expanded constitutional interpretation approach does not 
prove viable for transitory or other categories of disaster. For 
 
 284. Id. at 340. 
 285. Jayne E. Daly, A Glimpse of the Past—A Vision for the Future: Senator Henry M. 
Jackson and National Land-Use Legislation, 28 URB. LAW. 7, 12 (1996) (citing National Land 
Use Policy Act of 1970, S. 3354, 91st Cong. § 407(1), 116 CONG. REC. S1757, S1762 (Jan. 
20, 1970)). 
 286. Id. at 18. 
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transitory disasters, in fact, a bilateral mechanism might be the most 
viable as it would perhaps be the best way to capitalize on local 
information and decision-making; its voluntary nature would also 
avoid federalism concerns because transitory disasters implicate land-
use planning more closely tied to traditional state and local 
functions. 
D. Horizontal 
A horizontal approach to reconstituting federalism would result 
if subnational governments agreed with other subnational 
governments to take collective action to address land-use planning in 
the disaster law context—even in the absence of a top-down mandate 
or voluntary bilateral program. For example, states can create 
regional land-use disaster management plans, whereby each agrees to 
legislate minimum standards related to the siting of development in 
disaster-prone areas, the structural requirements that mitigate 
disaster destruction, and other standards. 
A top-down approach is a compulsory mechanism for the federal 
government to reconstitute federalism, while a bilateral approach 
operates by federal provision of incentives to do the same. 
Horizontal approaches, on the other hand, rely almost entirely on 
the volition of subnational governments (unless the horizontal 
approaches are themselves induced by federal incentives). This is the 
same volition, notably, that currently facilitates a great degree of 
subnational government inaction on crafting disaster-related, land-
use planning standards. In this way, horizontal approaches may be 
unlikely, absent some other change in the status quo spurred by 
higher levels of governance. Ultimately, it is unclear why subnational 
governments that currently fail to maintain individual jurisdictional 
standards related to disaster land-use planning would band together 
to craft standards with a group of other states or local governments.  
Indeed, forging horizontal approaches can be intractable in the 
absence of incentives or mandates from a higher regulatory 
authority, or from sustained, increased attention and pressure from 
civil society.287 As Professor Buzbee describes in the context of land-
use policies exacerbating urban sprawl,  
 
 287.  Buzbee, supra note 96, at 94. 
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[Local government] officials will in most instances not surrender 
authority [for horizontal approaches] . . . . Greater governmental 
consolidation and coordination might reduce sprawl and its 
associated ills, but it is difficult to see how such consolidation and 
coordination would come about in the absence of a period of 
heightened citizen political involvement sufficient to persuade the 
state government to modify the authority granted to local 
governments.288  
Even so, this approach should be briefly discussed, as it is not 
without precedent. In the disaster context, though not related 
specifically to land-use-related disaster mitigation and prevention 
policies, a horizontal example exists in the form of the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).289 EMAC is an interstate 
compact providing for mutual cooperation among states to 
supplement federal response and aid subsequent to disaster events.290 
The EMAC establishes that “[e]ach party state entering into this 
compact recognizes that many emergencies transcend political 
jurisdictional boundaries and that intergovernmental coordination is 
essential in managing these and other emergencies under this 
compact.”291 All fifty states have entered the compact, and the 
National Emergency Management Association has prepared “Model 
Intrastate Mutual Aid Legislation” to “facilitate mutual aid 
agreements between political subdivisions of a state.”292 EMAC 
proved to be one of the few relative successes in facilitating response 
after Hurricane Katrina.293 
There are additional reasons that state or local governments 
might band together to create, for example, “Regional Land Use 
Disaster Management Standards.” The first is simply federal inaction. 
In the climate change context, federal inaction has spurred the 
creation of a number of carbon cap-and-trade initiatives aimed at 
curbing carbon emissions. These cap-and-trade initiatives include the 
following: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, including the 
states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
 
 288. Id. at 95–96. 
 289. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 
3877 (1996). 
 290.  FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 171. 
 291. Id. at 172. 
 292. Id. at 176. 
 293. Id. at 177–78. 
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New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont; the Midwestern Regional GHG Reduction Accord, 
including the states of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, 
and Wisconsin, and the Canadian province of Manitoba; and the 
Western Climate Initiative, including the states of Arizona, 
California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, 
and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, 
and Quebec.294 Indeed, states may be motivated to tie carbon 
sequestration offsets to their carbon-trading schemes in a way that 
fundamentally alters land-use standards related to wetland and forest 
restoration and preservation—which would also mitigate and prevent 
damage related to flooding, sea-level rise, hurricanes, forest fires, and 
even heat waves as carbon-based natural capital is integrated into 
land-use plans and reduces ambient local temperatures. Indeed, 
coastal wetlands are the resource that sequesters carbon to the 
greatest degree—greater than nearly any other upland terrestrial 
ecosystem.295  
Additionally, if states are truly concerned with federal inaction on 
climate change, as evidenced by the formation of regional cap-and-
trade schemes, then presumably they would be interested in reducing 
the destruction from urbanization of natural capital that protects 
against disaster events, such as floodplain wetlands. After all, it seems 
that preserving natural capital like coastal wetlands to sequester 
carbon may potentially be less politically contentious than reducing 
industrial emissions—though certainly there are private property 
rights to consider. Even so, if state and local governments get serious 
about the threats to wetlands and other natural capital from 
urbanization,296 then there are strong incentives to create regional 
land-use compacts in order to head off concerns of a race-to-the-
bottom, whereby urban development interests might flee to other 
jurisdictions due to floodplain wetland or other resource preservation 
statutes in the jurisdiction in which they wish to develop.297 By 
crafting regional agreements, individual state and local governments 
 
 294. See North American Cap-and-Trade Initiatives, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/NA-capandtrade 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
 295. Joy B. Zedler & Suzanne Kercher, Wetland Resources: Status, Trends, Ecosystem 
Services, and Restorability, 30 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 39, 55 (2005).   
 296. See generally WEAR & GREIS, supra note 133. 
 297. See Hudson, supra note 17; see also supra Part III.B. 
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can preserve economic growth while tackling both climate change 
and disaster mitigation and prevention via forest or wetland carbon 
sequestration in areas that would otherwise be under development 
pressure. 
Ultimately, there is little precedent in the United States for 
subnational horizontal approaches to land-use planning. The drivers 
for such arrangements, however, may be in place, with states already 
taking action on carbon cap-and-trade and facing threats to natural 
capital from urbanization. As with bilateral mechanisms, horizontal 
mechanisms would be suitable to address transitory disasters in 
particular; the “fit” of regional land-use policies related to transitory 
disasters that have more localized impacts is perhaps more conducive 
to horizontal approaches. Given the broader scale of “gray area” and 
perpetual disasters, however, it would seem horizontal approaches 
would only be useful in the event there were no other mechanisms in 
place to holistically address those categories of disaster. Even then, a 
patchwork of regional horizontal schemes would likely not provide 
the most effective means of addressing perpetual and “gray area” 
disasters. Though of course, in line with principles of dynamic 
federalism, a mix of approaches across scales should be utilized to 
address all categories of disaster. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the climate continues to change and populations continue to 
increase, so too will disasters continue to grow in both frequency 
and severity. One of the clearest means of mitigating or preventing 
future disaster events is to reconceptualize the society- and 
economic-driven structure of a land-use planning system that too 
often places people directly in the path of disaster events. The 
propensity of people to live in hazardous areas “may appear to be the 
result of private, individual decisions,”298 but are actually “shaped by 
local land use policies, and those local land use decisions are, in turn, 
heavily influenced by state and federal incentives. Effective mitigation 
of all types of natural hazards . . . thus depends heavily on 
governmental actions and decisions.”299  
Though state and federal incentives certainly play a role in either 
facilitating or avoiding land-use-related disasters, federal 
 
 298. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 25. 
 299. Id. at 26. 
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constitutional structure that effectively prohibits certain types of 
regulatory prohibitions from being formulated at the federal level 
also complicates responsible land-use planning in the disaster 
context. For certain disasters, like those that are perpetual in nature 
or in the “gray area,” greater federal input is clearly warranted. They 
also may be more constitutionally justified, even given remnant 
dualist conceptions of land-use federalism. In addition, consistent 
with principles of dynamic federalism, bilateral and horizontal 
approaches for reconstituting land-use federalism are valuable for 
addressing both perpetual and “gray area” disasters as well as 
transitory disasters.  
Ultimately, a more clear and holistic focus on the institutional 
hurdles that complicate land-use-related disaster mitigation and 
prevention allows a corresponding focus on the types of legislative 
responses needed to address them. A failure to craft effective 
legislative responses in the face of these institutional hurdles and a 
failure to reconstitute the current and inadequate balance of multi-
level governance aimed at land-use planning will only beget a 
continuation of a vicious cycle after disaster strikes—state and local 
governments crying out for the federal cavalry to come and save 
them from land-use planning mistakes for which they are primarily 
responsible. 
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